Scout, LLC v. Truck Insurance Exchange Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 45349 by unknown
UIdaho Law 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law 
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
3-7-2018 
Scout, LLC v. Truck Insurance Exchange Respondent's Brief Dckt. 
45349 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs 
Recommended Citation 
"Scout, LLC v. Truck Insurance Exchange Respondent's Brief Dckt. 45349" (2018). Idaho Supreme Court 
Records & Briefs, All. 7209. 
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/7209 
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All by 
an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact 
annablaine@uidaho.edu. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO 
SCOUT LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
company, doing business as Double Tap Pub, 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
vs. 
TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE, an 
inter-insurance exchange organized under the 
laws of the State of California, 
Defendant/Respondent, 
and 
FARMERS GROUP, INC., a California 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
Supreme Court No. 45349 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
In and for the County of Ada, Honorable Steven Hippler, District Judge, Presiding 
Jeffrey A. Thomson 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone: (208) 343-5454 
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844 
jat@elamburke.com 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Chynna C. Tipton 
TIPTON LAW, PLLC 
910 W. Main Street, Suite 242 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone: (208) 906-1500 
tipton@tiptonlawyers.com 
Attorneys for Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. ST A TEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................................................... 1 
A. Nature of the Case ..................................................................................................... 1 
B. Course of Proceedings ............................................................................................... 2 
C. Statement of Facts ..................................................................................................... 2 
1. OBC Complaint. .............................................................................................................. 2 
2. The Policy ....................................................................................................................... 3 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL ........................................................................................ 5 
III. ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................................ 5 
A. Standard of Review ................................................................................................... 6 
B. Analysis ..................................................................................................................... 6 
1. The OBC Complaint Did Not Give Rise to a Potential for Liability Under the 
Policy; No Duty to Defend was Triggered; the District Court Properly Granted 
Summary Judgment Dismissing Breach of Contract. ...................................................... 7 
a. There is No Genuine Dispute Over Facts Bearing on Coverage ................................... ? 
(1) Under Idaho Law, Only Facts Within the Four Comers of the Underlying 
Complaint Filed Against Its Insured Can Be Considered to Determine Whether 
There is a Duty to Defend ........................................................................................ 8 
(2) The Test for Determining the Potential for Liability Under the Policy Does Not 
Change When an Exclusion is Involved .................................................................. 9 
(3) There is No Dispute Over Any Facts Alleged in the OBC Complaint that Bear on 
Whether the Prior Publication Exclusion Applies ................................................. 10 
(4) Scout Cannot Create a Genuine Dispute Over the Facts Bearing on Coverage by 
Looking at Facts Outside the OBC Complaint ...................................................... 13 
b. There is No Genuine Dispute Over Application of the Policy's Language to the 
Undisputed Facts Bearing on Coverage ........................................................................ 13 
(1) The Prior Publication Exclusion is Clear and Unambiguous .............................. .15 
(2) Application of the Clear and Unambiguous Prior Publication Exclusion to the 
Undisputed Facts Shows No Potential for Liability Under the Policy .................. 17 
c. There are No Genuine Disputes Over Facts Bearing on Coverage or Genuine 
Disputes Over Application of the Prior Publication Exclusion to Those Facts; 
Therefore, There is No Potential for Liability Under the Policy for All Claims Alleged 
in the OBC Lawsuit ....................................................................................................... 25 
2. Without Coverage There Can Be No Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith 
and Fair Dealing or Bad Faith; the District Court Properly Granted Summary 
Judgment Dismissing Breach of the Implied Covenant and Bad Faith .............................. 31 
a. The District Court Properly Dismissed Breach of the Implied Covenant.. ................... 31 
b. The District Court Properly Dismissed Bad Faith ........................................................ 32 
3. Scout is Not Entitled to Attorney Fees, Even if it Prevails on Appeal ......................... 34 
IV. CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................... 35 
11 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mocaby, 133 Idaho 593,601,990 P.2d 1204, 1212 (1999) ............................ 34 
AMCO Ins. Co. v. Tri-Spur Investment Co., 140 Idaho 733, 738, 101 P.3d 226,231 (2004) ... 9, 15 
American Motorists Ins. Co. v. L-C-A Sales Co., 713 A.2d 1007 (N.J. 1998) .............................. 18 
Applied Bolting Technology Products Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 942 F.Supp. 
1029, 1036-37 (E. D. PA 1996) ................................................................................................. 20 
Armstrong v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 147 Idaho 67, 69,205 P.3d 1203, 1205 (2009) ...... 16, 21 
Arreguin v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 145 Idaho 459,461, 180 P.3d 498,500 (2008) .............. 16 
Black v. Fireman's Fund American Ins. Co., 115 Idaho 449,455, 767 P.2d 824, 830 (Ct.App. 
1989) .......................................................................................................................................... 14 
Capitol Indemnity Corp. v. Elstone Self-Service Wholesale Groceries, Inc., 559 F.3d 616,620 
(7th Cir. 2009) ........................................................................................................................... 16 
Cascade Auto Glass, Inc. v. Idaho Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 141 Idaho 660, 115 P.3d 
751 (2005) ............................................................................................................................ 15, 16 
Construction Management System, Inc. v. Assurance Co. of America, 135 Idaho 680, 
682-83, 23 P.3d 142, 144-145 (2001) .......................................................................... 7, 8, 10, 15 
DeLuna v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 149 Idaho 81, 84, 233 P.3d 12, 15 (2008) .................. 14 
Dominguez, ex rel. Hamp v. Evergreen R.E.S., Inc. 142 Idaho 7, 13, 121 P.3d 938, 
944 (2005) .................................................................................................................................. 33 
Farm Bureau Ins. Co. of Idaho v. Kinsey, 149 Idaho 415,418, 234 P.3d 739, 742 (2010) ...... 6, 25 
Federal Ins. Co. v. Tri-State Ins. Co., 157 F.3d 800, 804 ( 10th Cir. 1998) .................................. 17 
Hanover Ins. Co. Urban Outfitters, Inc., 806 F.3d 761 (3rd Cir. 2015) .................................. 28, 29 
Hoyle v. Utica Mut'l Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 367, 371-372, 48 P.3d 1256, 
1260-1261 (2002) ...................................................................................................... 2, 7, 8, 9, 15 
Ill 
Hugenberg v. West Am. Ins. Co./Ohio Cas. Group, 249 S.W.3d 174, 186 
(Ky. Ct. App. 2006) ................................................................................................................... 17 
Idaho First Nat. Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, 121 Idaho 266, 288, 824 P.2d 841, 863 (1991) ..... 32 
Intermountain Forrest Mgt., Inc. v. Louisiana Pacific Corp., 136 Idaho 233,235, 31 P.3d 921, 
923 (2001) ..................... 6Kim Seng Co. v. Great American Ins. Co. of New York, 179 Cal.App. 
4th 1030, 1044, 101 Cal. Rptr.3d 537, 548 (2009) ........................................................ 18, 23, 24 
Kootenai County v. Western Cas. and Sur. Co., 113 Idaho 908, 910-11, 750 P.2d 87, 89-90 ........ 9 
Matagorda Ventures, Inc. v. Travelers Lloyds Ins. Co., 203 F. Supp. 2d 704 
(S.D. Tex. 2000) ...................................................................................................... 22, 23, 29, 30 
Meadowbrook, Inc. v. Tower Ins. Co., Inc., 559 N.W.2d 411,419 (Minn. 1997) ......................... 18 
Mortensen v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 149 Idaho 437,445,235 P.3d 387, 395 (2010) ................ 32 
Nettleton v. Canyon Outdoor Media, 163 Idaho 70, _, 408 P.3d 70-71 (2017) .......................... 6 
Records v. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins., 683 A.2d 834 (N.J. Super. 1996) ........................................... 18 
Rizza v. State Farm Ins. Co., 155 Idaho 75, 84,305 P.3d 519,528 (2013) .................................. 32 
Robinson v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 173, 176, 45 P.3d 829, 832 (2002) .... 32 
Simper v. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. of Idaho, 132 Idaho 471,474,974 P.2d 1100, 1103 
(1999) ......................................................................................................................................... 34 
State v. Barrett, 138 Idaho 290,295, 62 P.3d 214, 219 (Ct.App. 2003) ....................................... 33 
Street Swfing, LLC v. Great American E & S Ins. Co., 776 F.3d 603,610 
(9th Cir. 2014) ............................................................................................................... 17, 2 7, 28 
Taco Bell Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 388 F.3d 1069, 1072-73 (7th Cir. 2004) ......... 18, 30 
Taurus Holdings, Inc. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 913 So. 2d 528,539 (Fla. 2005) ........ 17 
Transportation Ins. Co. v. Pennsylvania Manufacturer Assoc. Ins. Co., 346 Fed.Appx., 
862, 863 (3rd Cir. 2009) ............................................................................................................ 20 
United National Ins. Co. v. Spectrum Worldwide, 555 F.3d 772, 777 (9th Cir. 2009) ........... 16, 29 
Statutes 
Idaho Code § 41-1839( 1) ............................................................................................................... 34 
Idaho Code § 41-1839( 4) ............................................................................................................... 34 
lV 
Other Authorities 
http://www.dictonary.com/browse/materialize ............................................................................. 18 
http:\www.dictionary.com/browse/arising .................................................................................... 17 
Rules 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure lO(c) ............................................................................................... 2 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) ............................................................................................... 6 
V 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This appeal arises out of a federal trademark infringement lawsuit ("OBC Lawsuit") 
brought by Oregon Brewing Company ("OBC") for the wrongful use of its trademark "Rogue" 
by Appellant Scout, LLC, d/b/a Gone Rogue Pub ("Scout"). The OBC Complaint alleged that 
Scout's wrongful use of its trademark (an "advertising injury") began in October 2012. (R., p. 
51, <J[ 14.) (Appendix A.) This infringing use/advertising injury began before Respondent Truck 
Insurance Exchange ("Truck") issued a Businessowners Liability policy to Gone Rogue Pub 
("Policy") on November 7, 2012. (R., p. 162.) 
Scout tendered the defense of the OBC Lawsuit to Truck under the Policy. (R., p. 326.) 
The Policy excluded from coverage any advertising injury "[a]rising out of oral or written 
publication of material whose first publication took place before the beginning of the policy 
period." ("Prior Publication exclusion") (R., p. 234.) (Appendix B.) Truck denied coverage and 
the tender of defense based on the Prior Publication exclusion and the allegations in the OBC 
Complaint that the first publication of the infringing mark took place in October 2012, before the 
beginning of the Policy period on November 7, 2012. (R., pp. 336-342.) 
Scout sued Truck for allegedly breaching its duty to defend it in the OBC Lawsuit. (R., 
p. 6-13.) The District Court granted summary judgment dismissing breach of contract on the 
grounds that there was no potential for liability under the Policy because the Prior Publication 
exclusion applied and therefore Truck had no duty to defend Scout in the OBC Lawsuit and 
dismissing breach of the implied covenant of good faith and good fair dealing and bad faith on 
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the grounds that there can be neither if there is no coverage under the Policy or breach of 
contract. (R., pp. 595-613.) (Appendix C.) 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
Truck agrees with Scout's "Procedural History" but adds the following: 
Scout timely filed its Notice of Appeal on August 23, 2017. (R., pp. 616-621.) 
C. Statement of Facts. 
Truck disagrees with Scout's characterization that the District Court's recitation of facts 
in its Memorandum Decision and Order on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment are "factual 
findings". The parties requested a jury trial and, therefore, the District Court was not a finder of 
fact when ruling on the motions for summary judgment. (R., pp. 13, 22.) Truck agrees that 
Scout has correctly quoted the District Court's recitation of facts but disagrees that all of the 
facts set forth by Scout are relevant to the issues on appeal. The parties, the District Court and 
this Court are constrained to reviewing the facts in the OBC Complaint and the Policy to 
determine whether the District Court properly granted summary judgment. See Hoyle v. Utica 
Mut'l Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 367, 371-372, 48 P.3d 1256, 1260-1261 (2002). Truck refocuses the 
facts accordingly: 
1. OBC Complaint 
Within the four corners of the OBC Complaint and its attachments, 1 the following facts 
bearing on coverage are alleged: 
1 Attachments to a complaint are a part of the complaint for all purposes. I.R.C.P. lO(c). 
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a. OBC has continuously used the Rogue mark in the name of Rogue-
branded restaurants, brew pubs and alcohol beverages since 1989 and 
owns five (5) trademark registrations for the Rogue mark for use with 
restaurant and pub services, glassware, beer, ale and clothing. (R., p. 50, 'II 
9.) 
b. These marks were applied for and issued prior to Scout/Gone Rogue Pub's 
"conduct giving rise to" the OBC Lawsuit. (R., p. 50, 'I[ 10.) 
c. Scout/Gone Rogue Pub's "conduct giving rise to" the OBC Lawsuit began 
in October 2012 when Scout/Gone Rogue Pub commenced use of the 
Rogue mark to market and advertise Gone Rogue Pub. (R., p. 51, 'II 14.) 
d. Scout/Gone Rogue Pub continued to use the same Rogue mark until at 
least September 2014. (R., pp. 52-53, 'I[ 17.) 
e. The unauthorized use of the Rogue mark violated all five (5) trademarks 
held by OBC. (R., pp. 53-54, 'I[ 24.) 
f. Scout/Gone Rogue Pub's wrongful conduct caused harm to OBC. (R., p. 
54, 'II 25.) 
g. Attached as an exhibit to the OBC Complaint is a Facebook posting 
showing use in the Gone Rogue name and logo of the infringing Rogue 
mark in October 2012. (R., p. 131.) ("October Post") The Facebook 
posting shows a picture of the "Gone Rogue Pub" logo with 
accompanying text stating "Here is our new logo! Signs are going up 
today and tomorrow! Hope everyone likes it! Let us know what you guys 
think ! " / d. 
(Appendix A.) 
2. The Policy. 
The Policy was issued with an effective Policy period beginning November 7, 
2012. (R., p. 162.) The relevant provisions of the Policy are as follows: 
BUSINESSOWNERS LIABILITY COVERAGE FORM 
A. Coverages 
1. Business Liability 
a. We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally 
obligated to pay as damages because of "bodily injury", 
"property damage", "personal injury" or "advertising 
injury" to which this insurance applies. We will have the 
right and duty to defend the insured against any "suit" 
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seeking those damages. However, we will have no duty to 
defend the insured against any "suit" seeking damages for 
"bodily injury", "property damage", "personal injury", or 
"advertising injury" to which this insurance does not apply. 
b. This insurance applies: 
(2) To: 
B. Exclusions 
(b) "Advertising injury" caused by an offense 
committed in the course of advertising your 
goods, products, or services; 
but only if the offense was committed in the 
"coverage territory" during the policy period. 
1. Applicable To Business Liability Coverage 
This insurance does not apply to: 
p. Personal Or Advertising Injury 
"Personal Injury" or "advertising injury": 
(2) Arising out of oral or written publication of material 
whose first publication took place before the 
beginning of the policy period; 
F. Liability And Medical Expenses Definitions 
1. "Advertising injury" means injury arising out of one or more of the 
following offenses: 
a. Oral or written publication of material that slanders or 
libels a person or organization or disparages a person's or 
organization's goods, products or services; 
b. Oral or written publication of material that violates a 
person's right to privacy; 
c. Misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing 
business; or 
d. Infringement of copyright, title or slogan. 
(R., pp. 229,231,234, 239.) (Appendix B.) 
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II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL. 
Truck believes that the "Issues Presented on Appeal" can be more clearly and co~cisely 
stated as follows: 
1. Did the District Court properly grant summary judgment dismissing breach of 
contract on the grounds that there was no potential for liability under the Policy because 
coverage was excluded and, therefore, there was no duty to defend? 
2. Did the District Court properly grant summary judgment dismissing breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and bad faith on the grounds that there can be no 
breach of the implied covenant or bad faith when there is no coverage or breach of contract? 
3. Whether Scout is entitled to attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code § 41-1839? 
III. ARGUMENT 
The OBC Complaint clearly alleges the undisputed facts bearing on coverage -
advertising injury (infringement of a trademark) arising out of a written publication of allegedly 
infringing material (the Gone Rogue Pub name and logo) first published by Scout (in October 
2012) before the Businessowners Policy became effective (November 7, 2012). Application of 
the clear and unambiguous Policy language (the Prior Publication exclusion) to these undisputed 
facts show that there is no potential for liability under the Policy. There is no duty to defend 
when there is no potential for liability under the Policy. Because there was no duty to defend, 
there was no breach of contract and because there was no breach of contract there can be no 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing or bad faith. The District Court 
properly dismissed Scout's Complaint against Truck. 
5 
A. Standard of Review. 
When reviewing the grant of a motion for summary judgment, this Court applies the 
same standard used by the District Court in ruling on the motion. Farm Bureau Ins. Co. of Idaho 
v. Kinsey, 149 Idaho 415,418,234 P.3d 739,742 (2010). Summary judgment is proper if the 
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(a). The Court is to liberally construe all disputed 
facts and draw all reasonable inferences from the record in favor of the nonmoving party. 
Nettleton v. Canyon Outdoor Media, 163 Idaho 70, _, 408 P.3d 70-71 (2017). (Citations 
omitted.) The moving party carries the burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of 
material fact. Id. "The fact that the parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment does 
not change the applicable standard of review and this Court must evaluate each party's motion 
on its own merits." Intermountain Forrest Mgt., Inc. v. Louisiana Pacific Corp., 136 Idaho 233, 
235, 31 P.3d 921, 923 (2001 ). The filing of cross-motions for summary judgment does not 
establish the absence of genuine issues of material fact, nor does it transform the trial court that 
will hear those motions into the trier of fact. Nettleton, 163 Idaho at __ , 408 P.3d at 71. 
B. Analysis. 
There is no breach of contract by Truck unless there was a duty to defend Scout against 
the allegations and claims in the OBC Complaint. There is no duty to defend if there is no 
potential for liability under the Businessowners Policy. There is no potential for liability under 
the Policy if the claims alleged in the OBC Complaint are excluded from coverage. All of the 
claims alleged in the OBC Complaint are excluded from coverage by the Prior Publication 
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exclusion. There is no potential for liability under the Policy. There was no duty to defend 
Scout in the OBC Lawsuit and therefore there was no breach of contract. 
1. The OBC Complaint Did Not Give Rise to a Potential for Liability Under the 
Policy; No Duty to Defend was Triggered; the District Court Properly 
Granted Summary Judgment Dismissing Breach of Contract. 
There is no duty to defend if the allegations in the underlying complaint do not give rise 
to a potential for liability under the insurance policy. Hoyle, 137 Idaho at 373, 48 P.3d at 1262. 
"The duty to defend exists so long as there is a genuine dispute over facts bearing on coverage 
under the policy or over the application of the policy's language to the facts." Construction 
Management System, Inc. v. Assurance Co. of America, 135 Idaho 680, 682-83, 23 P.3d 142, 
144-145 (2001 ). Scout argues on appeal: (1) there exists a genuine dispute over the facts 
bearing on coverage because the District Court erred when it broadly construed the OBC 
Complaint to determine whether the Prior Publication exclusion applied; and (2) there exists a 
genuine dispute over the application of the Policy language to the facts because the District 
Court erred in finding the Prior Publication exclusion was unambiguous because: (a) there is a 
split of authority amongst other Courts in the interpretation and application of the exclusion; and 
(b) the exclusion is susceptible to at least two differing and reasonable interpretations as applied 
to this case. 
a. There is No Genuine Dispute Over Facts Bearing on Coverage. 
Under Idaho law, the only facts bearing on coverage are those facts alleged in the OBC 
Complaint. There is no genuine dispute over those facts. Scout attempts to create a dispute by 
looking at facts outside of the OBC Complaint that allegedly show that the prior publication of 
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OBC's Rogue mark was not injurious when made or did not cause the same injury as later 
publications or were fresh wrongs not otherwise excluded. However, disputes based on facts 
outside of the OBC Complaint are irrelevant to the determination of whether there is a potential 
for liability under the Policy. Regardless, the OBC Complaint alleges injury arising out of the 
pre-policy publication and continuing to cause the same or similar injury after the Policy was 
issued. 
(1) Under Idaho Law, Only Facts Within the Four Corners of the 
Underlying Complaint Filed Against Its Insured Can Be 
Considered to Determine Whether There is a Duty to Defend. 
The analysis of whether an insurer has a duty to defend an insured is limited to a review 
of the facts and allegations of the complaint filed against the insured (sometimes referred to as 
the Four Corners Doctrine) and a determination of whether the complaint, read broadly, gives 
rise to a potential for liability covered by the policy. Hoyle, 137 Idaho at 371-372, 48 P.3d at 
1260-1261 (2002). Whether the complaint gives rise to a potential for liability under the 
insurance policy is determined exclusively by the facts and claims alleged in the complaint. 
Hoyle, 137 Idaho at 373, 48 P.3d at 1262 (citing Construction Management System, Inc., 135 
Idaho at 684, 23 P.3d at 146 (" ... an insurer does not have to look beyond the words of the 
complaint to determine if a possibility of coverage exists.").) In Hoyle, the insured argued that 
the facts behind the complaint filed in the underlying action potentially gave rise to an action for 
negligence and, therefore, the insurer had a duty to defend. Id., 137 Idaho at 373, 48 P.3d at 
1262. This Court rejected that argument and held that whether the complaint gives rise to a 
potential for liability under the insurance policy is determined exclusively by the facts and claims 
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alleged in the complaint. Id. See also AMCO Ins. Co. v. Tri-Spur Investment Co., 140 Idaho 
733, 738, 101 P.3d 226, 231 (2004) (holding that even if the facts behind a complaint may give 
rise to a covered claim, such facts are irrelevant to an insurer's duty to defend). 
(2) The Test for Determining the Potential for Liability Under the 
Policy Does Not Change When an Exclusion is Involved. 
Scout argues, however, that the Four Corners Doctrine for determining whether there is a 
duty to defend is a two-step process: ( 1) the OBC Complaint allegations must be construed 
broadly when examining the insuring language in the policy to determine if there is any potential 
for coverage; and (2) the OBC Complaint allegations must then be construed narrowly to 
determine whether an exclusion to coverage applies. The District Court erred, argues Scout, 
because it broadly construed the OBC Complaint when it applied the Prior Publication exclusion. 
There is no such two-step process. In Idaho, the complaint is read broadly for all 
purposes in determining whether there is a potential for liability under the Policy. This holistic 
approach requires comparing a broad reading of the OBC Complaint to the Policy as a whole to 
determine if there is a potential for liability under the Policy. This broad reading of the 
complaint generally favors the insured. As this Court has previously held: 
The problem that faces the insurers when a claim is made is determining if there 
is a potential for liability. However, ... since the advent of notice pleading there 
will likely be broad ambiguous claims made against the insured making it more 
difficult for the insurer to determine whether the insurance policy covers the 
claims .... 
Hoyle, 137 Idaho at 372, 48 P.3d at 1265, quoting Kootenai County v. Western Cas. and Sur. 
Co., 113 Idaho 908, 910-11, 750 P.2d 87, 89-90. But, when a broad reading of the Complaint 
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reveals no potential for liability under the policy as a whole, including exclusions, an insurer has 
no duty to defend the excluded claims. See Construction Mgt. System v. Assurance Co. of 
America, 135 Idaho 680, 683, 23 P.3d 142, 145 (2001). The District Court properly applied the 
Four Corners Doctrine. 
(3) There is No Dispute Over Any Facts Alleged in the OBC 
Complaint that Bear on Whether the Prior Publication Exclusion 
Applies. 
The Policy excludes coverage for advertising injury "[a]rising out of oral or written 
publication of material whose first publication took place before the beginning of the policy 
period". (R., p. 234.) (Appendix B.) The only facts bearing on coverage are those alleged in the 
OBC Complaint. The inquiry is thereby limited to whether the OBC Complaint alleges: (1) an 
advertising injury; (2) when the infringing material was first published; and (3) when the Policy 
period began. If the allegations in the OBC Complaint allege an advertising injury and that 
Scout began using OBC' s Rogue mark before the Policy period, there is no genuine dispute over 
the facts bearing on coverage. 
An "advertising injury" is an injury arising out of a misappropriation of advertising ideas 
or style or an infringement of copyright, title or slogan. (R., p. 239.) The OBC Complaint 
alleges an advertising injury. (R., p. 49 (<J[ 1 - "[t]his is an action for trademark counterfeiting, 
trademark infringement ... "); pp. 51-52 (<J[ 14-Scout "created a Facebook page ... and began 
marketing and advertising the ROGUE restaurant and bar ... including using photographs of 
people partaking in alcoholic beverages, using beverage glassware and coasters containing the 
mark ROGUE, wearing clothing containing the mark ROGUE, depicting beer taps for various 
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beers on tap at Gone Rogue Pub ... "); p. 52 ('I[ 16 - "OBC ... called one of [Scout's] owners ... 
and explained that their conduct infringed OBC's federally registered trademarks."); p. 53 ('I[ 18 
- "Defendants' conduct is likely to cause confusion, mistake and/or deception as to the 
affiliation, connection or association of Defendants with OBC and as to whether OBC approves, 
sponsors or endorses Defendants' services."); p. 53 ('I[ 19 - "Defendants' conduct constitutes 
intentional and deliberate trademark counterfeiting and infringement. Defendants used OBC's 
ROGUE mark with the intention of trading on the good will and reputation of OBC's mark."); p. 
53, ('I[ 20 - "Unless enjoined, Defendants' continued unlawful conduct will irreparably injure 
OBC .... ").) 
The OBC Complaint alleges when the infringing mark was first published. The OBC 
Complaint specifically states that "[i]n October 2012 ... [Scout] commenced use of the mark 
ROGUE in the name of their restaurant and bar ('Gone Rogue Pub')." (R., p. 51, 'I[ 14.) The 
attachments to the OBC Complaint include photos with "comments" by third parties that predate 
November 7, 2012 (some dating back to August 2012). (R., pp. 126, 128 and 130.) Also 
attached to the OBC Complaint is the October Post, a printed screenshot from Gone Rogue Pub's 
Facebook page posting an image of their logo using the ROGUE mark with the statement "Here 
is our new logo! Signs are going up today and tomorrow! Hope everyone likes it! Let us know 
what you think!" (R., p. 131.) Three comments on the logo are dated October 11, 2012. (Id.) 
The allegations in the OBC Complaint clearly fix October 2012 (if not earlier) as the start date of 
Scout's publishing material using the ROGUE mark. 
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The Policy period began on November 7, 2012. (R., pp. 162, 165 and 171.) It is 
undisputed that Scout first published material using the ROGUE mark before the Policy period 
began. 
An example of a dispute over facts bear on coverage in the context of this matter would 
be if the OBC Complaint did not allege a date of first publication at all, or if it alleged 
inconsistent dates (e.g., October 2012 and December 2012). Then the facts bearing on coverage 
would be disputed and Truck would be required to provide a defense, at least until the dispute 
over the facts was resolved. But, no such dispute exists here. The Complaint expressly and 
specifically alleges an advertising injury beginning with the wrongful use of the ROGUE mark 
prior to the Policy and continued use of that same mark after the Policy. Had, under the 
scenarios described above, the District Court selected an alleged date that favored no coverage 
over an alleged date that favored coverage, there may have been error. Had the District Court 
looked behind the Complaint to determine when the infringing publication was first published, 
there may have been error. Here, however, there was no need to construe, interpret, or select 
facts within the Complaint, or otherwise examine facts outside the Complaint because the 
Complaint clearly set forth a single date when first publication occurred. 
The only facts that can be considered in determining whether there is a duty to defend are 
those facts alleged in the OBC Complaint. There is no dispute that the OBC Complaint alleged 
an advertising injury that arose out of allegedly infringing material first published before the 
beginning of the Policy period. These facts bearing on coverage are not in dispute. Under Idaho 
law, the analysis of the facts bearing on coverage should end here. 
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(4) Scout Cannot Create a Genuine Dispute Over the Facts Bearing on 
Coverage by Looking at Facts Outside the OBC Complaint. 
Scout attempts to create a dispute over the facts bearing on coverage by looking to facts 
outside of the Complaint. Scout argues that the Prior Publication exclusion does not apply 
because facts outside the Complaint show that the alleged advertising injury was not actionable 
or injurious when made and was not the same injury caused by subsequent publications. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 30-31.) Scout asked the District Court to consider that Gone Rogue Pub, 
at the time it first published the ROGUE mark, was not yet open or operating as a pub, had not 
yet received necessary licenses or permits and was not yet selling beer, ale, glassware or 
clothing. (Id.) These facts are not alleged in the OBC Complaint and cannot be considered as 
facts bearing on coverage or considered in determining whether there is a potential for liability 
under the Policy. The District Court did not err by not considering these facts in granting 
summary judgment.2 
b. There is No Genuine Dispute Over Application of the Policy's Language 
to the Undisputed Facts Bearing on Coverage. 
Scout argues that because there is a split of authority in other jurisdictions over the 
interpretation and application of the Prior Publication exclusion, it is not clear and unambiguous 
and that the Prior Publication exclusion is susceptible to differing interpretations in the 
circumstances of this matter. 
2 The District Court did, alternatively, consider the facts outside of the OBC Complaint but held 
that even if they were considered there was no potential for liability under the Policy. (R., pp. 
607,608,610, 611-12.) 
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An insurer has a duty to defend if there is "a genuine dispute over the application of the 
policy's language to the facts." DeLuna v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 149 Idaho 81, 84,233 
P.3d 12, 15 (2008). A split of authority or differing potential interpretations does not create a 
genuine dispute over the application of the Policy language to the specific facts alleged in the 
underlying complaint. There is no requirement, when interpreting an insurance policy, that the 
Court must adopt case law most favorable to an insured. The Court is only obligated to apply the 
correct law when examining legal issues in the context of the particular facts bearing on 
coverage. The District Court properly found that the Prior Publication exclusion was clear and 
unambiguous and only required that the advertising injury arise out of the prior publication. 
Regardless, the undisputed facts bearing on coverage (those alleged in the OBC 
Complaint) show that the Prior Publication exclusion provides no potential for liability under the 
Policy regardless of which differing interpretation is adopted when applied to this case. The 
OBC Complaint alleges injury from the prior publication of the Rogue mark, that the prior 
publication violated all five trademarks, that the prior publication was the basis for each separate 
tort alleged in the OBC Complaint and that the prior publication infringement was a continuing 
infringement through to and including at least nearly two years after the Policy was issued. (R., 
pp. 51-54, <JI<![ 14, 17, 24, 25.) 
While the duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify, the duty to defend is not 
absolute. Black v. Fireman's Fund American Ins. Co., 115 Idaho 449,455, 767 P.2d 824, 830 
(Ct.App. 1989). If the facts and claims alleged in an action filed against an insured trigger the 
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application of a clear and unambiguous exclusion from coverage, the insurer has no duty to 
defend the insured. Construction Mgt., 135 Idaho at 684, 23 P.3d at 146. 
In Construction Mgt., this Court held that a commercial general liability insurer had no 
duty to defend its insured against a claim of copyright infringement. The Court stated that "the 
insurer may not be required to defend if it can establish that the exclusion contained in the policy 
is clear and unambiguous." Construction Mgt., 135 Idaho at 684, 23 P.2d at 146. See also 
AMCO Ins. Co., 140 Idaho at 738-9, 101 P.3d at 231-2 (holding that a policy exclusion negated 
an insurer's duty to defend a sexual harassment complaint). Therefore, if the Prior Publication 
exclusion clearly and unambiguously applies to the undisputed facts alleged in the OBC 
Complaint, there is no duty to defend. See Hoyle, 137 Idaho at 373, 48 P.3d at 1262 (the policy's 
intentional act exclusion negated the insurer's duty to defend the claim for breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing). As discussed above, the facts alleged in the OBC 
Complaint are not disputed. As discussed below, the application of the Prior Publication 
exclusion to the facts is also not disputed. 
(1) The Prior Publication Exclusion is Clear and Unambiguous. 
The test for determining whether policy language is clear and unambiguous is set forth in 
Cascade Auto Glass, Inc. v. Idaho Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 141 Idaho 660, 115 P.3d 751 (2005): 
In interpreting an insurance policy, "where the policy language is clear and 
unambiguous, coverage must be determined, as a matter of law, according to 
the plain meaning of the words used." . . . In construing an insurance policy, 
the Court must look to the plain meaning of the words to determine if there are 
any ambiguities. This determination is a question of law. 
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Id., 141 Idaho at 662-63, 115 P.3d at 753-54 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). A court, by 
construction, cannot create a liability not assumed by the insurer, or make a new contract for the 
parties, or one different from that plainly intended, nor add words to the contract of insurance to 
create or avoid liability. Armstrong v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 147 Idaho 67, 69, 205 P.3d 
1203, 1205 (2009). In deciding whether a particular provision is ambiguous, the provision must 
be read within the context in which it occurs in the policy. Id., 147 Idaho at 70, 205 P.3d at 
1206. The District Court correctly placed the burden on Truck to use clear and precise language 
if it wishes to restrict the scope of its coverage. (R., p. 606 (quoting Arreguin v. Farmers Ins. 
Co. of Idaho, 145 Idaho 459,461, 180 P.3d 498,500 (2008).) The District Court correctly 
recognized that a provision that seeks to exclude coverage must be strictly construed in favor of 
the insured. Id. 
The identical Prior Publication exclusion has been held by other courts to be clear and 
unambiguous.3 (See e.g., United National Ins. Co. v. Spectrum Worldwide, 555 F.3d 772, 777 
(9th Cir. 2009) ("Plainly reading the first publication exclusion and the relevant advertising 
injury definition together indicates that the parties intended it to exclude from coverage any 
copyright infringement injury that arose from an oral or written publication of material first 
published before the policy became effective."); Capitol Indemnity Corp. v. Elstone Self-Service 
Wholesale Groceries, Inc., 559 F.3d 616, 620 (7th Cir. 2009) ("We do not see any ambiguity in 
the meaning of the [Prior Publication] exclusion; it seems clear that the exclusion ... abrogates 
3 Neither the parties nor the District Court were able to locate an Idaho appellate court decision 
interpreting the Prior Publication exclusion. 
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the duty to defend where the insured's first publication of actionable material occurred prior to 
the beginning of its policy"). 
(2) Application of the Clear and Unambiguous Prior Publication 
Exclusion to the Undisputed Facts Shows No Potential for 
Liability Under the Policy. 
The Prior Publication exclusion is included in a liability insurance policy to insulate an 
insurer from providing coverage for a risk that arose before the policy was issued: 
The Policy's prior publication exclusion exempts from coverage '[p]ersonal and 
advertising injury' arising out of oral or written publication of material whose first 
publication took place before the beginning of the policy period. The 
straightforward purpose of this exclusion is to 'bar coverage' when the 'wrongful 
behavior ... [began] prior to the effective date of the insurance policy'. 
Street Swfing, LLC v. Great American E & S Ins. Co., 776 F.3d 603,610 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(citation omitted) (emphasis added). Here, as in Street Surfing, the Policy excludes coverage for 
advertising injury "arising out of' the publication of material whose first publication took place 
before the policy became effective. (R., p. 234.) "Arise" is defined as "to come into being, 
action or notice; originate; appear; spring up." http:\\www.dictionary.com/browse/arising. The 
phrase "arising out of' as used in insurance policy has been interpreted to mean "originating 
from" or "growing out of' or "flowing from" or "done in connection with" - "that is, it requires 
some causal connection to the injuries suffered, but does not require proximate cause in the legal 
sense." Federal Ins. Co. v. Tri-State Ins. Co., 157 F.3d 800, 804 (10th Cir. 1998).4 
4 See also Hugenberg v. West Am. Ins. Co./Ohio Cas. Group, 249 S.W.3d 174, 186 (Ky. Ct. App. 
2006) ("arising out of" means "originating from, or having its origin in, growing out of or 
flowing from"); Taurus Holdings, Inc. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 913 So. 2d 528, 539 
(Fla. 2005) ("arising out of' as used in a Commercial General Liability policy exclusion is 
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The Prior Publication exclusion thereby precludes coverage of the chance that advertising 
injuries will materialize from the pre-policy publication of allegedly infringing material. "Risk" 
is defined as "exposure to the chance of injury or loss; a hazard or dangerous chance." 
http://www.dictionary.com/browse/risk. "Materialize" is defined as "to come into perceptible 
existence; appear; become actual or real." http://www.dictonary.com/browse/materialize. Taco 
Bell Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 388 F.3d 1069, 1072-73 (7th Cir. 2004) ("[T]he purpose 
of insurance is to spread risk - such as the risk that an advertising campaign might be deemed 
tortious - and if the risk has already materialized, what is there to insure?") (internal citation 
omitted). Kim Seng Co. v. Great American Ins. Co. of New York, 179 Cal.App. 4th 1030, 1044, 
101 Cal. Rptr.3d 537, 548 (2009) ("The purpose of the prior publication exclusion is to preclude 
coverage for risks that have already materialized .... ). 
The chance of an advertising injury arising out of Scout's use of the ROGUE mark in the 
Gone Rogue Pub name and logo came into existence in October 2012 (at the latest). The OBC 
Complaint alleges that Scout's use of the Gone Rogue Pub name and logo was continuous from 
at least as early as October 2012, until the OBC Complaint was filed on October 14, 2014. (R., 
pp. 48, 51.) That there was a risk of advertising injury created by Scout's pre-policy publication 
of the Rogue mark is proven by the complaint allegation that OBC contacted Scout just two 
unambiguous and broader in meaning than the term "caused by" and means "originating from," 
"having its origin in," "growing out of," "flowing from," "incident to" or "having a connection 
with"); Meadowbrook, Inc. v. Tower Ins. Co., Inc., 559 N.W.2d 411,419 (Minn. 1997) ("arising 
out of' in a Commercial General Liability insurance policy exclusion means "causally connected 
with" and not "proximately caused by"); accord Records v. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins., 683 A.2d 834 
(N.J. Super. 1996), American Motorists Ins. Co. v. L-C-A Sales Co., 713 A.2d 1007 (N.J. 1998). 
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months after it opened the Gone Rogue Pub and explained that Scout's "conduct infringed 
OBC's federally registered trademarks." (R., p. 52, <J[ 16.) Based on the clear and unambiguous 
terms and the purpose of the Prior Publication exclusion and applying that language to the 
undisputed facts bearing on coverage, the claims alleged in the OBC Complaint were excluded, 
there was no potential for liability under the Policy, and there was no duty to defend. 
Scout argues that the District Court erred in finding that the Prior Publication exclusion 
unambiguously excluded coverage because the language of the exclusion does not have a 
"settled legal meaning" because other courts have interpreted or applied the language differently. 
Scout argues that because there is a split of authority the District Court was required to accept 
the holdings of those courts that favored Scout. This is not the proper standard for determining 
whether there is a dispute over the application of the policy's language to the facts requiring a 
duty to defend. The District Court is required to apply the law correctly, not to apply the law 
that favors one party over the other. The District Court did so here when it distinguished those 
cases Scout felt favored its position on either the facts, the law or both. 
In addition, Scout argues that the term "publication of material" in the Prior Publication 
exclusion is susceptible to at least two differing interpretations when applied to the facts of this 
case and the District Court erred when it did not adopt an interpretation that required the prior 
publication to be actionable (injurious when published) or cause the same harm as subsequent 
publications. The District Court properly adopted the legally correct interpretation of the 
exclusion. The District Court also properly held that no matter the interpretation, the exclusion 
eliminated any potential for liability under the Policy. 
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First, the District Court did not err in its application of the case law to the Policy 
language and the facts bearing on coverage. That the District Court can properly find the Prior 
Publication exclusion to be unambiguous as applied to the circumstances and facts of the present 
case, even though other Courts have found the exclusion to be ambiguous, is proved by case law 
relied on by Scout to support its differing interpretation of the exclusion. The Court in 
Transportation Ins. Co. v. Pennsylvania Manufacturer Assoc. Ins. Co., 346 Fed.Appx., 862, 863 
(3rd Cir. 2009) held: 
Although the "prior publication" exclusion has been considered ambiguous in 
other circumstances, it is not ambiguous in the circumstances before us. Because 
the underlying complaint clearly states that all of the relevant injurious conduct 
began in August 1999 - more than six months before the ... policy period 
commenced. 
Id. at 863. The Third Circuit determined that the exclusion was not ambiguous in those 
situations when the underlying complaint alleges that the relevant conduct began before the 
Policy period even though the exclusion might be ambiguous in other situations. That is the 
situation here - the alleged wrongful conduct began in October 2012, before the Policy period 
began on November 7, 2012 and therefore the Prior Publication exclusion is not ambiguous. See 
also Applied Bolting Technology Products Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 942 
F.Supp. 1029, 1036-37 (E. D. PA 1996) (citations omitted) ("Under the exclusion's plain terms, 
the 'first publication' date is a landmark: if the injurious advertisement was 'first published' 
before the policy coverage began, then coverage for the 'advertising injury' is excluded. It is 
irrelevant that later publications, made after the policy became effective, also caused 'advertising 
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injury' or increased the damages."). 5 In the present case, the first publication (landmark) date is 
October 2012. Scout's alleged wrongful use of the ROGUE mark in its advertisement was first 
published before the Policy coverage began on November 7, 2012. It is irrelevant to the 
coverage determination that later publications also caused advertising injury or increased the 
damages. Here, under the exclusion's plain terms, there is no potential for liability under the 
Policy and therefore no duty to defend. 
The District Court properly distinguished Capitol Indemnity's interpretation of the 
exclusion because, under Idaho law, a court must apply the policy according to its plain language 
and not add words to either create or avoid liability. (R., p. 608.) (citing Armstrong, 147 Idaho at 
69-70, 205 P.3d at 1205-06.) The Prior Publication exclusion does contain the words 
"actionable" or "injurious". Instead, the exclusion applies where the advertising injury "arises 
out of' the first publication of the infringing material. The District Court examined the plain 
meaning of the phrase "arising out of' and the case law treatment of that phrase as used in 
insurance policies and determined that the Prior Publication exclusion did not require the first 
publication of material be independently "actionable" or "injurious" for the exclusion to apply. 
(R., p. 608.) 
Rather, it need be causally connected to the advertising injuries alleged. Stated 
another way, the advertising injuries alleged must flow from the first publication, 
but the first publication need not be the proximate cause of the injuries. To 
construe the provision as requiring that the first publication be independently 
injurious or actionable would not only ignore the common definition of "arising 
out of' but would also insert words where they do not appear, which is contrary to 
5 The fact that these Courts used the term "injurious" did not change the interpretation of the 
exclusion or make it ambiguous in the circumstances of those cases. 
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Idaho's rules of contract interpretation. For this reason, the court does not find 
Scout's interpretation reasonable and, therefore, does not find the exclusion 
ambiguous for the reasons cited by Scout. 
(R., pp. 608-609.) 
The District Court also properly distinguished Capitol Indemnity's application of the 
Prior Publication exclusion to the facts in that case: 
Capitol Indemnity involved a suit for trademark infringement based on the 
defendant's sale of counterfeit cigarettes displaying the Newport trademark. 559 
F.3d at 619-20. Prior to the effective date of the policy, the defendant sold 
genuine Newport cigarettes with packaging and wrapping displaying the Newport 
marks. After the policy went into effect, however, the defendant began selling 
counterfeit cigarettes in the same packaging. Id. The insurer argued that the Prior 
Publication exclusion barred coverage - and, therefore abrogated its duty to 
defend - because the cigarette packaging and wrapping containing the Newport 
marks was first "published" before the policy began. Id. at 620. The court 
disagreed because the pre-policy publication was not actionable - the defendant 
was actually selling genuine Newport cigarettes. Id. The infringement alleged in 
the underlying complaint was the defendant's sale of counte,feit cigarettes with 
Newport packaging, not the sale of genuine Newport cigarettes. Id. at 619. By 
contrast, OBC alleged that Scout's pre-policy publication of the Gone Rogue Pub 
logo in October of 2012 marked the origination date of Scout's acts that resulted 
in the infringement. 
(R., pp. 609-610.) 
The District Court then properly analyzed and relied on that case law which was 
consistent with Idaho's rules of construction. For instance, in Matagorda Ventures, Inc. v. 
Travelers Lloyds Ins. Co., 203 F. Supp. 2d 704 (S.D. Tex. 2000), Plaintiff Matagorda Ventures 
sought a declaration that its insurer, Travelers, owed a duty to defend it in a trademark and 
copyright infringement lawsuit brought by Movado Group. Matagorda, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 706. 
Travelers, relying on an identical Prior Publication exclusion, moved for summary judgment on 
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the basis that the material from which Movado's infringement claims against Matagorda arose 
was published on Matagorda's website prior to the date the policy was issued. Id. at 712. The 
District Court granted summary judgment to Travelers. Id. 
Like Scout, Matagorda argued that the Prior Publication exclusion did not apply because 
Movado's claims for infringement were not actionable until after the policy was issued because 
some of the copyrights allegedly infringed upon were not registered when the prior publications 
took place and therefore the prior publications were not infringing, thereby triggering Traveler's 
duty to defend the entire suit. Id. at 717-718. The appellate court rejected this argument. Id. 
The Court held that when an infringement claim becomes actionable is irrelevant under the plain 
language of the Prior Publication exclusion. Id. The only relevant inquiry is whether the 
infringement claim arose from material published before the policy period began: 
The relevant question for the exclusion, however, is not when the claim first 
became actionable, but when the material giving rise to the claim was first 
published. The copyright infringement claim arose from "material whose first 
publication took place before the beginning of the policy period." 
Id. The Matagorda court's holding is consistent with the plain language of the Truck Policy and 
was properly adopted by the District Court. When the actual infringement does or does not 
occur is irrelevant to application of the Prior Publication exclusion if the alleged advertising 
injury arises from a pre-policy publication.6 
Further, support for the District Court's holding is found in Kim Seng Co. v. Great 
American Ins. Co. of New York, 179 Cal.App.4th 1030, 101 Cal.Rptr.3d 186 (2009), as modified 
6 under the relevant facts bearing on coverage (those in the OBC Complaint), the infringement 
began before the Policy and the advertising injuries arose out of that prior publication. 
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on denial of reh 'g (Dec. 7, 2009). There, the insured argued that the Court should consider 
whether its pre-policy publication gave rise to the "likelihood of confusion" and constituted 
infringement when it was made. Kim Seng Co., 179 Cal. App. at 1043, 101 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 54 7. 
The Court held "[w]e do not deal with whether there was an infringement, but rather whether 
there is coverage." Id. Likewise, here, whether the October 2012 Facebook post did or did not 
infringe on OBC's marks when it was published is irrelevant to coverage. Only whether the 
advertising injury alleged in the OBC Complaint arose out of Scout's October 2012 use of the 
"Gone Rogue Pub" name and logo. It did. 
Second, even accepting Scout's argument that the Prior Publication exclusion is 
ambiguous and susceptible to differing interpretations and required the "publication of material" 
to be injurious or cause the same harm, the District Court found that the facts bearing on 
coverage in the OBC Complaint demonstrated that there was no dispute that the publication of 
the material was injurious and caused the same harm. 
Here, the OBC Complaint alleges that Scout's use of the "ROGUE" mark was 
unauthorized, the use commenced in October of 2012, and the use caused OBC 
harm. Thus, the OBC Complaint asserts a continuing course of infringing and 
injurious conduct since prior to the effective date of the policy. Whether or not 
Scout's October Post was actually injurious because Gone Rogue Pub was not yet 
opened for business is not germane to the inquiry since injury beginning in 
October of 2012 was clearly alleged in the OBC Complaint. 
(R., p. 607.) The analysis need go no further. Even under Scout's proposed interpretation, the 
District Court alternatively applied the case law "favorable" to Scout in construing the terms of 
the Prior Publication exclusion, and interpreted that exclusion as if it were ambiguous and 
determined, based on the allegations in the OBC Complaint (the only relevant facts that bear on 
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coverage) that the advertising injury claims alleged against Scout did not give rise to the 
potential for liability under the Policy. See Farm Bureau Ins. Co. of Idaho v. Kinsey, 149 Idaho 
415,419,234 P.3d 739, 743 (2010) (the District Court acknowledged that the phrase "residents 
of your household" is potentially ambiguous but found that sufficient evidence was presented to 
demonstrate that Jamey was not a resident of the household in spite of any ambiguity). 
c. There are No Genuine Disputes Over Facts Bearing on Coverage or 
Genuine Disputes Over Application of the Prior Publication Exclusion to 
Those Facts; Therefore, There is No Potential for Liability Under the 
Policy for All Claims Alleged in the OBC Lawsuit. 
Scout argues that the District Court erred in finding that the October Post excluded 
coverage of all claims alleged in the OBC Complaint. Specifically, Scout argues that the OBC 
Complaint alleges five separate torts based on five different trademarks and that Truck must 
show that the prior publication constituted a violation of each tort and a violation of all five 
trademarks. At most, argues Scout, the October Post violates only one trademark (for restaurant, 
pub and catering services) but did not violate the other trademarks. Scout contends that use of 
the Rogue mark on glassware, clothing, beer and ale did not relate to ( or arise out of) its prior 
publication of the identical Rogue mark in the Gone Rogue Pub name and logo. Scout contends 
that these uses constitute "fresh wrongs" to which the Prior Publication exclusion does not apply. 
The entirety of Scout's argument relies on examining facts outside of the OBC 
Complaint. In other words, Scout cannot even argue that there were later publications of the 
Rogue mark that were "fresh wrongs" without looking behind the OBC Complaint. In addition, 
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the case law relied on by Scout to create these "fresh wrongs" is either contrary to its position or 
factually distinguishable. 
Scout creates so-called "fresh wrongs" and "later uses" of the Rogue mark by pointing to 
facts outside of the OBC Complaint that Gone Rogue Pub was not yet open, was not yet selling 
beer or ale, and was not yet selling glassware or clothing when the first publication of the mark 
was made and before the Policy became effective. Therefore, Scout claims, any infringement on 
four of the five trademarks could not have occurred until after the Policy was issued. There are 
no allegations in the OBC Complaint that Gone Rogue Pub was not yet open or that it was not 
selling beer, ale or merchandise when the first publication occurred or until after the Policy was 
issued. There are no allegations of post-policy uses of the Rogue mark that caused separate, 
distinct and fresh wrongs or that there were different post-policy infringements from the pre-
policy infringements. The District Court correctly held that "Scout's argument relies on facts 
outside of the allegations of the OBC Complaint, which is irrelevant in considering whether an 
insurer has a duty to defend. Rather, as discussed above, the duty to defend is framed solely by 
the allegations of the underlying complaint." (R., p. 607.) The Complaint alleges a single 
continuing wrong based on the pre-policy publication with all advertising injuries arising out of 
that pre-policy publication. There are no facts bearing on coverage (within the four corners of 
the OBC Complaint) to support "fresh wrongs" to which the Prior Publication exclusion does not 
apply. 
Regardless, case law supports that whatever later uses were made of the ROGUE mark, 
they were not "fresh wrongs". The Ninth Circuit held that when there is a publication of material 
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prior to policy issuance and the insured continues to publish the same material after policy 
issuance, the publications are part of a "single, continuing wrong" dating back to before the 
policy took effect, triggering application of the Prior Publication exclusion. Street Swfing LLC, 
776 F.3d at 610. 
In the context of advertising injury coverage, an allegedly wrongful advertisement 
published before the coverage period triggers application of the prior publication 
exclusion .... If this threshold showing is made, the exclusion bars coverage of 
injuries arising out of republication of that advertisement, or any substantially 
similar advertisement, during the policy period, because such later publications 
are part of a single, continuing wrong that began before the insurance policy went 
into effect. 
Id. (emphasis added). In Street Su,fing, there was a single pre-policy publication of a logo "for 
the purpose of attracting future customers who might like what they saw ... " and later 
publications on other products. Nevertheless, the Prior Publication exclusion applied. Id. at 612. 
The determination to be made here is whether the OBC Complaint alleges Scout's continued use 
of the same or substantially similar Rogue mark before and after the policy effective date. The 
OBC Complaint unambiguously does so. (R., pp. 51-54.) The Prior Publication exclusion 
applies. 
In Street Su,fing, the infringer initially sold skateboards affixed with a particular Street 
Surfing logo. Id. at 606. After obtaining insurance, Street Surfing expanded its product line to 
skateboard accessories, also affixed with the Street Surfing logo. Ultimately, Street Surfing was 
sued by the owner of the mark and Street Surfing's insurer declined to defend based on the Prior 
Publication exclusion. Id. Street Surfing sued its insurer, arguing inter alia, that its pre-policy 
publication of the logo was not substantially similar to the post-policy advertisements because 
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they were affixed to different products. Id. at 612-13. The Street Su,fing Court disagreed for 
two reasons. First, the underlying complaint did not charge the misappropriations as separate 
torts depending on the specific advertisements. Rather, it generally alleged that Street Surfing 
infringed on the mark by using the same name and logo on its products, without making any 
distinction between the types of products. Id. at 614. Second, although the advertisements 
featured different products, the court found it was not a "material distinction", because the 
advertising idea being used was the same regardless of the product: the products all used the 
allegedly infringing identification "Street Surfing." Id. 
Here, the OBC Complaint did not charge the infringements as separate torts depending on 
whether the logo appeared on a sign, glassware, clothing, beer or ale. Rather, the OBC 
Complaint alleged that Scout infringed on the mark by using the same name and logo to 
advertise and market before and continued to do so after the Policy without making any 
distinction between what sign or product the name and logo was on. Scout used the same name 
and logo regardless of the product: the products all used the allegedly infringing Rogue mark in 
the name and logo. 
Likewise, in Hanover Ins. Co. Urban Outfitters, Inc., 806 F.3d 761 (3rd Cir. 2015), 
Hanover sought a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to defend its insured, Urban 
Outfitters, in an underlying trademark infringement action brought against Urban Outfitters by 
the Navajo Nation. The underlying trademark action complaint alleged that Urban Outfitters had 
been advertising, promoting and selling goods under the Navajo name and marks since at least 
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March 16, 2009. Id. at 763. Urban Outfitters, like Scout, tendered the defense of the trademark 
action to Hanover Insurance. Id. at 766. 
Hanover first issued a commercial general liability policy to Urban Outfitters on July 7, 
2010. Id. at 764. The policy's Prior Publication exclusion was identical to that in Truck's Policy. 
Id. Holding that Hanover had no duty to defend Urban Outfitters, the Third Circuit stated: 
In each instance, Navajo Nation fixed March 16, 2009 (if not earlier) as a start 
date for Urban Outfitters' alleged misconduct. Under the terms of the Hanover 
policies' "prior publication" exclusions, we must treat this date of "first 
publication" as a landmark. Because Hanover was not responsible for Urban 
Outfitters' liability insurance coverage until sixteen months thereafter, the 
exclusions apply. 
Id. at 767. See also United Nat. Ins. Co. v. Spectrum Worldwide, Inc., 555 F.3d 772, 780 (9th 
Cir. 2009), (holding that because the insured's first publication of infringing material was prior 
to the policy inception date, the Prior Publication exclusion applied and there was no duty to 
defend the insured). 
Further support is again found in Matagorda. Matagorda argued in that case, like Scout 
does in this appeal, that the Prior Publication exclusion only applied to some of the claims 
alleged in the underlying trademark infringement lawsuit and not others and therefore Traveler's 
duty to defend the entire suit was triggered. Matagorda, 203 F.Supp.2d at 717-178. The 
Matagorda court rejected this argument, finding that all of the infringement claims were based 
on material first published on Matagorda's website before the policy inception date. 
Second, plaintiffs argue that even if the "first publication" exclusion applies to 
some of the Movado Group claims, other Movado Group claims are not subject to 
the exclusion, triggering the duty to defend. If some of the causes of action 
alleged in the Movado Group suit were not subject to the exclusion or otherwise 
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outside the scope of coverage, Travelers would have a duty to defend the entire 
lawsuit. However, all the causes of action asserted in the Movado Group 
complaint arose from the content of, and information posted on, the 
wristwatch.com web site. The material of the web site constitutes the "written 
material" first published before the beginning of the policy period. All of the 
Movado Group claims are subject to the exclusion. Travelers owes plaintiffs no 
duty to defend. 
Matagorda, 203 F.Supp.2d at 718. (internal citation omitted.) Likewise, the OBC Complaint 
alleges that all of the violations and causes of action originated with and arose out of Scout's 
undisputed use of the Rogue mark in October 2012. 
The District Court properly distinguished Taco Bell Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 
388 F.3d 1069 (7th Cir. 2004) on the grounds that unlike in Taco Bell, the OBC Complaint did 
not charge separate torts based on uses prior to the Policy period versus during the Policy period 
and that there was no thematic difference between the alleged publications here as there was in 
Taco Bell. (R., p. 612.) The District Court held "[r]ather, as in Street Swfing, Scout's 
publications all arise from [the] same single, continuous use [of] the word 'ROGUE' in 
advertising Gone Rogue Pub, which is an appropriation of OBC's advertising idea [and] 
[t]herefore, Scout's post-[policy] effective date uses of the mark are not 'fresh wrongs' which 
avoid the application of the Prior Publication exclusion." (Id.) 
It is undisputed that the Complaint alleges that Scout published the Gone Rogue Pub logo 
and name on Facebook in October 2012 for the express purpose of advertising and marketing. 
Scout thereafter engaged in a "single, continuing wrong" by continuously using the same Gone 
Rogue Pub name and logo at least until the OBC complaint was filed on October 14, 2014. Like 
Street Swfing, Scout continued to use the same Gone Rogue Pub name and logo in violation of 
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all of the trademarks. The OBC Complaint did not allege separate legal violations for each 
infringing use of the Rogue mark by Scout; rather, it alleged legal violations that all originated 
with the first use of the "Gone Rogue Pub" name and logo in October 2012. These continuous 
violations are not "fresh wrongs" and the Prior Publication exclusion applies to negate coverage 
for all claims alleged against Scout in the OBC Complaint. 
2. Without Coverage There Can Be No Breach of the Implied Covenant of 
Good Faith and Fair Dealing or Bad Faith; the District Court Properly 
Granted Summary Judgment Dismissing Breach of the Implied Covenant 
and Bad Faith. 
Scout requests that this Court reverse the District Court's grant of summary judgment 
dismissing the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and bad faith claims 
and to adjudicate those claims and find that Truck actually breached the implied covenant and is 
liable for bad faith. As discussed below, this Court can only reverse dismissal of breach of the 
implied covenant and bad faith if it reverses dismissal of the breach of contract claim. Even if 
this Court reverses dismissal of the breach of contract claim, it cannot, as requested by Scout, 
adjudicate those claims in this appeal or affirmatively determine that Truck breached the implied 
covenant or is liable for bad faith. 
a. The District Court Properly Dismissed Breach of the Implied Covenant. 
The District Court properly dismissed the breach of the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing when it determined there was no coverage, no duty to defend, and, therefore, no 
breach of contract. An implied duty of good faith and fair dealing "exists between insurers and 
insureds in every insurance policy." Mortensen v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 149 Idaho 437, 445, 
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235 P.3d 387, 395 (2010). The covenant requires that "the parties perform in good faith the 
obligations imposed by their agreement," and a violation of the covenant occurs only when 
"either party ... violates, nullifies or significantly impairs any benefit" of the contract. Idaho 
First Nat. Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, 121 Idaho 266,288,824 P.2d 841,863 (1991). If there has 
been no breach of contract, however, there can be no impairment of any benefit under the contract 
and therefore no breach of an implied covenant. Id. Likewise, when there is no coverage under an 
insurance policy, there can be no breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. Rizza v. State 
Farm Ins. Co., 155 Idaho 75, 84,305 P.3d 519,528 (2013) (holding that if no benefit of the 
policy has been violated, nullified, or significantly impaired by the insurer's actions, there was no 
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.) Because there is no breach of the insurance 
contract, there can be no breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as a matter 
of law. 
b. The District Court Properly Dismissed Bad Faith. 
A predicate to an action for bad faith is a covered claim and a breach of the insurance 
contract. "Fundamental to the claim of bad faith is the idea that there must be coverage of the 
claim under the policy." Robinson v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 173, 176, 45 
P.3d 829, 832 (2002). The existence of a breach of a contractual duty is essential to the cause of 
action for bad faith. Robinson, 137 Idaho at 179, 45 P.3d at 835. "The duty in tort is founded 
upon contract and the existence of a breach of the contractual duty is essential to the cause of 
action in tort. The duty is in contract, the damages in tort." Id. The tort of bad faith cannot exist 
without a breach of a duty under the insurance contract. See Id. See also Rizzo, supra, 155 
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Idaho at 84, P.3d at 528 (holding that the insurer did not commit bad faith because there was no 
coverage under the policy.) Because there is no coverage under the Policy, there can be no bad 
faith as a matter of law. 
Even if the Court reverses the District Court's dismissal of breach of contract, the Court 
cannot adjudicate whether Truck breached the implied covenant or is liable for bad faith. First, 
the District Court did not address the merits of these claims and therefore the merits are not ripe 
for review by this Court. See State v. Barrett, 138 Idaho 290,295, 62 P.3d 214, 219 (Ct.App. 
2003). ("Where a district court has not ruled on an issue, it is not ripe for review and should be 
dismissed.") 
Second, Scout is asking this Court to review the District Court's denial of its cross 
motion for summary judgment. It is well settled in Idaho that "[a]n order denying a motion for 
summary judgment is an interlocutory order from which no direct appeal may be taken." 
Dominguez, ex rel. Hamp v. Evergreen R.E.S., Inc. 142 Idaho 7, 13, 121 P.3d 938, 944 (2005) 
(citation omitted). This rule is not altered by entry of an appealable final judgment. Id. 
Consequently, Scout's arguments in its Appellant's Brief that Truck is liable for breach of the 
implied covenant and bad faith are not relevant to the issues on appeal and should be stricken or 
ignored.7 
7 It should be noted that Scout claims that Truck breached the duty of good faith and acted in bad 
faith based on one of the alternative grounds for denying the duty to defend - that Scout, LLC 
was not listed as a named insured. It remains undisputed that Scout was not a named insured 
under the policy. (R., p. 165.) Regardless, breach of the duty of good faith and a claim for bad 
faith cannot arise from the insurer's actions when underwriting a policy (i.e., failing to identify 
Scout as the actual insured or having knowledge of Scout's association with Gone Rogue Pub). 
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The District Court properly dismissed breach of the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing and bad faith because there was no coverage or breach of contract. 
3. Scout is Not Entitled to Attorney Fees, Even if it Prevails on Appeal. 
Scout requests an award of attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code § 41-1839( 1) if it is 
the prevailing party. 8 Idaho Code § 41-1839(1) allows for attorney fees when an insurer fails to 
pay an insured within a specified period of time "the amount that person is justly due under such 
policy." Idaho Code§ 41-1839(1). Scout is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal under this 
section because there has been no determination of an "amount justly due" as required by this 
statute. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mocaby, 133 Idaho 593, 601, 990 P.2d 1204, 1212 (1999). 9 
See Simper v. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. of Idaho, 132 Idaho 471, 474, 974 P.2d 1100, 1103 
(1999). Consequently, there was no breach of the duty of good faith and Truck did not act in bad 
faith for raising the fact that Scout was not a "named insured" as one of several grounds for 
denying the claims (including that the claims were excluded by the Prior Publication exclusion). 
8 Scout also requests that this Court award attorney fees and costs incurred in the proceedings 
before the District Court. There were no attorney fees requested by either party in the District 
Court. There was no determination by the District Court relating to attorney fees. The issue of 
Scout's entitlement to attorney fees incurred below is not a proper issue on appeal because the 
District Court did not make a determination that Scout was the prevailing party (it was not) or 
determine an amount of attorney fees or costs to be awarded. 
9 Idaho Code § 41-1839( 4) also allows an award of attorney fees when a case is brought, pursued 
or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. Scout has not requested attorney 
fees on appeal under this section. Nor could it, since, as the prevailing party below, Truck is 
merely defending on appeal its win in the District Court. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
This appeal should be denied. The District Court's grant of summary judgment 
dismissing the complaint should be affirmed. Scout's request for attorney fees on appeal should 
be denied. 
DATED this i day of March, 2018. 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
By: 
omson, Of the firm 
t rneys for Respondent 
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SCOUT LLC, dba GONE ROGUE PUB, an 
Idaho limited liability company, JASON 
GRACIDA, an individual, PHO 
XA Y AMAHAKHAM, an individual, and 
TOM BUTLER, an individual, 
Defendants. 
Civil Action No.: 
COMPLAINT FOR TRADEMARK 
COUNTERFEITING, TRADEMARK 
INFRINGEMENT, FALSE 
DESIGNATION OF ORIGIN, UNFAIR 
COMPETITION AND TRADEMARK 
CYBERSQUATTING 
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 
Plaintiff Oregon Brewing Company ("OBC") for this Complaint against Defendants Scout 
LLC, dba Gone Rogue Pub, Jason Gracida, Pho Xayamahakham, and Tom Butler (hereinafter 
"Defendants"), alleges as follows: 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. This is an action for trademark counterfeiting, trademark infringement, false 
designation of origin, and unfair competition. OBC owns the well-known mark ROGUE for 
restaurants, pubs and alcohol beverages. Since 1989, OBC has continuously used the mark ROGUE 
in connection with the advertising, promotion and sale of alcohol beverages, as well as in the name 
ofa ROGUE-branded line ofrestaurants and brew pubs. OBC owns incontestable federal trademark 
registrations for ROGUE for alcohol beverages, restaurants, and glassware, and has been 
manufacturing and selling apparel since 1989. Despite OBC's registrations, Defendants commenced 
use of the mark ROGUE in the name of its restaurant and bar. 
THE PARTIES 
2. OBC is an Oregon corporation. 
3. Defendant Scout LLC, dba Gone Rogue Pub, is an Idaho limited liability company 
with its registered agent located at 12547 West Camas Drive, Boise, Idaho 83709 and doing business 
as Gone Rogue Pub at 409 South 81h Street, Boise, Idaho 83702. 
4. Defendant Jason Gracida is an individual who, on information and belief, is a co-
owner of Scout LLC, dba Gone Rogue Pub and conducts business in the District of Idaho. 
5. Defendant Pho Xayamahakham is an individual who, on information and belief, is a 
co-owner of Scout LLC, dba Gone Rogue Pub and conducts business in the District of Idaho. 
6. Defendant Tom Butler is an individual who, on information and belief, is a co-owner 
of Scout LLC, dba Gone Rogue Pub and conducts business in the District of Idaho. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
7. OBC's claims arise under the trademark laws of the United States (Trademark Act of 
1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq.), and the laws of the State of Idaho. This Court has subject matter 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332, 1338, 1367 and 15 U.S.C. § 1121. This Court has 
supplemental jurisdiction over the claims arising under the laws of the State of Idaho pursuant to 28 
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U.S.C. § l 367(a), because those claims are so related to the federal claims that they form part of the 
same case or controversy and derive from a common nucleus of operative facts. 
8. Venue is proper in this judicial district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because a 
substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims herein transpired in this judicial district. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
9. OBC is among the oldest and most well-established micro-brewers in the United 
States. Since 1989, OBC has continuously used the mark ROGUE in commerce in the name of~ 
ROGUE-branded line ofrestaurants and brew pubs, as well as for alcohol beverages. OBC owns the 
following federal trademark registrations for ROGUE: 
TRADEMARK REG.NO. REG.DATE GOODS I SERVICES 
ROGUE 2669318 12/31 /2002 Beer and ale 
ROGUE 3041464 01/10/2006 Restaurant, pub and catering services 
ROGUE 3126616 08/08/2006 Beverage glassware 
ROGUE 3773029 04/06/2010 Beer 
ROGUE 3365653 01 /08/2008 Clothing 
I 0. OBC's federally registered ROGUE marks were applied for and issued prior to 
Defendants' conduct giving rise to this action. OBC' s Registration Nos. 2669318; 3041464; 
3126616 and 3773029 for ROGUE have achieved " incontestable" status under the Federal 
Trademark Act which means that they are "conclusive evidence" of OBC's "ownership" of these 
marks, of the registration of those marks, the "validity" of the marks, and of OBC's "exclusive right" 
to use the ROGUE marks in commerce for the goods and services specified in the federal 
registrations. See 15 U.S.C. §§ I 065, l l l 5(b). 
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11. OBC's ROGUE mark is inherently distinctive because it does not describe an 
attribute of OBC's goods or services. 
12. OBC has invested considerable resources to develop and promote the mark ROGUE. 
Forover 15 years, OBC has advertised its ROGUE line ofrestaurants and alcohol beverages over the 
internet at rogueales.com and, starting in 1999, at rogue.com. On account of OBC's investment, 
and its long and substantial use of the mark ROGUE, that mark has come to be associated 
exclusively with goods and services emanating exclusively from OBC. OBC owns common law 
marks for ROGUE for alcohol beverages, restaurant and pub services, beverage glassware, and 
clothing. 
13. OBC operates 11 restaurants and brew pubs which feature the mark ROGUE. OBC 
has been advertising and selling its well-known ROGUE lagers, ales, porters, and stouts i~ Idaho, 
including in the Boise, Idaho Metropolitan Area, for over 15 years. OBC has advertised and sold 
ROGUE spirits in the Boise, Idaho Metropolitan Area since 2008. OBC's ROGUE mark for its 
lagers, ales, porters, stouts and spirits, restaurant and pub services is well-known in the Boise, Idaho 
Metropolitan Area and was so long before any of the conduct that forms the basis for this Complaint. 
OBC's ROGUE-branded beer and spirits are frequently served in restaurants and bars across the 
country and in the Boise, Idaho Metropolitan Area; ROGUE-branded beer is, or has been served, by 
defendants at their restaurant and bar ("Gone Rogue Pub"). 
14. In October 2012, long after OBC's first use and registration of the mark ROGUE, 
Defendants commenced use of the mark ROGUE as the name of their restaurant and bar ("Gone 
Rogue Pub"). In addition, Defendants created a Facebook Page 
www.facebook.com/GoneRoguePub and began marketing and advertising the ROGUE restaurant 
and bar at www.facebook.com/GoneRoguePub, including using photographs of people partaking in 
alcoholic beverages, using beverage glassware and coasters containing the mark ROGUE, wearing 
clothing containing the mark ROGUE, depicting beer taps for various beers on tap at Gone Rogue 
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Pub, including at least one of ROGUE' s beers, issued press releases specifically mentioning that the 
bar and restaurant serves ROGUE beers, and displayed ROGUE promotional material inside their 
restaurant and pub. A true and correct copy of pages from Defendants' Facebook page is attached as 
Exhibit A. 
15. On information and belief, Defendants and Defendants' actual and potential 
customers refer to Defendants' restaurant and bar as "Rogue", including on the menu. Defendants 
offer micro-brews at their restaurant and bar, including on information and belief, OBC's ROGUE 
beer. 
16. In January 2013, OBC owner Brett Joyce called one of Defendants' owners Mr. Jason 
Gracida and explained that their conduct infringed OBC's federally registered trademarks. Mr. 
Joyce attempted to discuss a reasonable resolution with Mr. Gracida that protected OBC's trademark 
rights and avoided litigation. Initially, Mr. Gracida indicated a willingness to work with OBC, but 
needed to discuss the matter with the co-owners and his attorney. Mr. Joyce followed up with Mr. 
Gracida by email in February 2013, asking that Mr. Gracida call him to discuss the issue. Mr. Joyce 
again indicated a willingness to be flexible with defendants and gave Mr. Gracida his personal cell 
phone number. Mr. Gracida never responded to Mr. Joyce. Instead, Mr. Joyce received an email 
from Mr. Gracida's attorney stating that all further correspondence should be directed to him. A 
subsequent telephone message from OBC's general counsel to defendants' attorney was ignored. 
17. Mr. Joyce again reached out to Mr. Gracida in August 2014, again expressing a desire 
to resolve this issue without resorting to litigation and was told to discuss the matter with co-owner 
Pho Xayamahakham. Mr. Joyce emailed Mr. Xayamahakham in September 2014 "in the hope that 
Mr. Xayamahakham would discuss a reasonable resolution of this matter but received no response. 
For over a year and a half OBC has attempted to reasonably resolve this issue with defendants in a 
manner that avoided litigation but protected its valuable trademark rights. Despite OBC's efforts, 
none of defendants' owners or representatives has acknowledged OBC's trademark rights, 
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defendants continue to use the ROGUE mark, and have left OBC with no option but to protect its 
valuable trademark rights through litigation. 
18. Defendants' conduct is likely to cause confusion, mistake and/or deception as to the 
affiliation, connection, or association of Defendants with OBC and as to whether OBC approves, 
sponsors or endorses Defendants' services. 
19. Defendants conduct constitutes intentional and deliberate trademark counterfeiting 
and infringement. Defendants used OBC's ROGUE mark with the intention of trading on the 
goodwill and reputation of OBC's mark. 
20. Unless enjoined, Defendants' continued unlawful conduct will irreparably injure 
OBC. OBC has no adequate remedy at law. 
COUNTI 
TRADEMARK COUNTERFEITING UNDER THE LANHAM ACT 
(15 u.s.c. § 1114) 
21. OBC incorporates by reference and re-alleges, as iffully set forth herein, paragraphs 
I through 20 of this Complaint. 
22. OBC owns incontestable federal trademark registrations.for ROGUE for restaurant 
and pub services (Reg. No. 3041464), beer and ale (Reg. No. 2669318), beer (Reg. No. 3773029), 
and beverage glassware (Reg. No. 3126616). 
23. Defendants' unauthorized use of ROGUE is likely to cause confusion, mistake, and 
deception as to the affiliation, connection, association, origin, sponsorship or approval of 
Defendants' services and business activities. 
24. Defendants' unauthorized use of ROGUE constitutes trademark counterfeiting 
because Defendants knowingly used the identical or substantially indistinguishable marks ROGUE, 
GONE ROGUE and GONE ROGUE PUB for the services contained in Plaintiff's federal trademark 
registration for ROGUE, Reg. No. 3041464, i.e., restaurant services, Reg. No. 2669318 i.e., beer and 
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ales, Reg. No. 3773029 i.e., beer, Reg. No. 3126616 i.e., beverage glassware, and clothing, Reg. No. 
3365653. 
25. As a direct result of Defendants' intentionally wrongful conduct, Defendants are 
causing OBC irreparable harm and have been unjustly enriched by their unlawful conduct. 
COUNT II 
TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND FALSE 
DESIGNATION OF ORIGIN UNDER THE LANHAM ACT 
(15 u.s.c. § 1114) 
26. OBC incorporates by reference and re-alleges, as if fully set forth herein, paragraphs 
l through 25 of this Complaint. 
27. OBC owns federal trademark registrations for ROGUE for restaurant and pub 
services, alcohol beverages, beverage glassware, and clothing. 
28. Defendants' unauthorized use of ROGUE, GONE ROGUE, GONE ROGUE PUB, 
and www.facebook.com/GoneRoguePub constitutes trademark infringement, unfair competition 
and false designation of origin because such conduct is likely to cause confusion, mistake, and 
deception as to the affiliation, connection, association, origin, sponsorship or approval of 
Defendants' services and business activities. 
29. As a direct result of Defendants' intentionally wrongful conduct, Defendants are 
causing Plaintiff irreparable harm and have been unjustly enriched by their unlawful conduct. 
COUNTIII 
TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT, UNFAIR COMPETITION, AND 
FALSE DESIGNATION OF ORIGIN UNDER THE LANHAM ACT 
(15 u.s.c. § 1125) 
30. OBC incorporates by reference and re-alleges, as iffully set forth herein, paragraphs 
l through 29 of this Complaint. 
31. OBC owns common law marks for ROGUE for alcohol beverages, restaurant, pub 
services, beverage glassware, and clothing. 
32. Defendants' unauthorized use of ROGUE, GONE ROGUE, GONE ROGUE PUB, 
and similar marks, as well as www.facebook.com/GoneRoguePub, constitutes trademark 
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infringement, unfair competition and false designation of origin because such conduct is likely to 
cause confusion, mistake, and deception as to the affiliation, connection, association, origin, 
sponsorship or approval of Defendants' services and business activities. 
33 . As a direct result of Defendants' wrongful conduct, Defendants are causing OBC 
irreparable harm and have been unjustly enriched by their unlawful conduct. 
COUNT IV 
CYDER-SQUATTING UNDER THE LANHAM ACT (15 U.S.C. § 1125) 
34. OBC incorporates by reference and re-alleges, as iffully set forth herein, paragraphs 
I through 33 of this Complaint. 
35. Defendants ' creation and use of www.facebook.com/GoneRoguePub constitutes 
cyber-squatting, because Defendants created and used www.facebook.com/GoneRoguePub in an 
attempt to profit from OBC's ROGUE marks. 
36. Defendants Facebook page www.facebook.com/GoneRoguePub is confusingly 
similar to OBC's mark ROGUE and OBC's mark ROGUE was distinctive at the time Defendant 
created the Facebook page www.facebook.com/GoneRoguePub. 
37. As a direct result of Defendants ' wrongful conduct, Defendants are causing OBC 
irreparable harm and have been unjustly enriched by their unlawful conduct. 
COUNTY 
UNFAIR BUSINESS PRACTICES UNDER IDAHO LAW 
(I.C. §§ 48-601 et seq.) 
38. OBC incorporates by reference and re-alleges, as iffully set forth herein, paragraphs 
I through 37 of this Complaint. 
39. Defendants' unauthorized use of ROGUE, GONE ROGUE, GONE ROGUE PUB 
and similar marks, as well as the creation and use of www.facebook.com/GoneRoguePub, 
constitutes passing off, unfair competition, and false designation of origin in violation of Idaho law 
because such conduct is likely to cause confusion, mistake, and deception as to the affiliation, 
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connection, association, origin, sponsorship or approval of Defendants' services and business 
activities. 
40. As a direct result of Defendants' wrongful conduct, Defendants are causing OBC 
irreparable harm and have been unjustly enriched by their unlawful conduct. 
COUNT VI 
COMMON LAW TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT 
(I.C. §§ 48-500 et seq.) 
41. OBC incorporates by reference and re-alleges, as iffully set forth herein, paragraphs 
I through 40 of this Complaint. 
42. Defendants' unauthorized use of ROGUE, GONE ROGUE, GONE ROGUE PUB, 
and similar marks, as well as the creation and use of www.facebook.com/GoneRoguePub, 
constitutes trademark infringement in violation ofldaho law because such conduct is likely to cause 
confusion or mistake or to deceive as to the source of origin of Defendants' services and business 
activities. 
43. As a direct result of Defendants' wrongful conduct, Defendants are causing OBC 
irreparable harm and have been unjustly enriched by their unlawful conduct. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, OBC prays that this Court enter judgment against Defendants and: 
I. That this Court grants a permanent injunction: 
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a. Enjoining Defendants, their employees, owners, agents, officers, directors, 
attorneys, representatives, affiliates, subsidiaries, successors and assigns, and 
all those in active concert or having knowledge of the causes of action, from 
using Plaintiffs ROGUE marks, alone or in combination with any other 
word(s), term(s), designation(s), mark(s), and/or design(s), as well as all 
similar marks and domain names, including, without limitation, ROGUE, 
GONE ROGUE, and GONE ROGUE PUB, as well as the Facebook page 
www.facebook.com/GoneRoguePub; 
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b. Requiring Defendants to destroy all literature, signs, billboards, labels, prints, 
packages, wrappers, containers, advertising materials, stationery, menus, 
beverage glassware and other items in their possession, custody or control 
that use ROGUE, GONE ROGUE, and GONE ROGUE PUB, as well as the 
Facebook page www.facebook.com/GoneRoguePub; 
c. Requiring Defendants to discontinue all use of the Facebook page 
www.facebook.com/GoneRoguePub; and 
d. Requiring Defendants to file with the Court and serve on Plaintiff, within 
thirty (30) days after entry of an injunction, a report in writing under oath 
setting forth in detail the manner in which Defendants have complied with 
the Court's injunction. 
2. That this Court grants relief in the form of reasonable costs and attorney fees to 
OBC pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117, 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (c), and the laws of the State of 
Idaho including, but not limited to, I.C. §§ 12-120, 12-121, 12-123, and 48-514. 
3. That this Court award treble damages to OBC pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117 and I.C. 
§ 48-514. 
4. That this Court grant OBC such other and further injunctive relief as it should 
deem just and proper. 
DATED THIS 14th day of October, 2014. 
PARSONS BEHLE & LA TIMER 
By Isl Dana M Herberholz 
Dana M. Herberholz 
Maria O. Hart 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Oregon Brewing Company 
COMPLAINT - I 0 
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DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury on all issues so triable pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 38. 
DA TED THIS 14th day of October, 2014. 
PARSONS BEHLE & LA TIMER 
By Isl Dana M Herberholz 
Dana M. Herberholz 
Maria O. Hart 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Oregon Brewing Company 
COMPLAINT - 11 
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409 S 8TH STREET #103 
BOISE ID 83702 
RESTAURANTS -PREMIER 
The named insured is an individual unless otherwise stated: 







Type of Business _R_E_S_T_A_U_RANT ________________________ _ 
2. Policy Period from 11/07 /12 (not prior to time applied for) to 11/07 /13 12:01 a.m. Standard Time 
If this policy replaces other coverage that ends at noon standard time of the same d~y this policy begins, this policy will 
not take effect until the other coverage ends. This policy will continue for successive policy periods as follows: If we elect 
to continue this insurance, we will renew this polic-y if you pay the required renewal premium for e-.ach successive policy 
('<'riod subject to our premiums, rules and forms then in effect. 
TI1is Policy Consists Of The Following Coverage Parts Listed Below And For Which A Premium Is Indic.ated. This 
Premium May Be Subject To Change. 
BUSINESSOWNERS POLICY 
EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES INSURANCE 
CERTIFIED ACTS OF TERRORISM -
Total *see Additional Fee Information below 
Sf>.S990 4TH EDITION 4-11 
S6S990-ED4 
p rem mm Af A r bl o· i M d'f ter .pp tea C 1scounl a.Ill 1 o 1 1cat1on 
$1,933.00 
COVERAGE INCLUDED 
SEE DISCLOSURE ENDORSEME~T INCLUDED 
See Invoice Attached 
~ FARMERS 
APPENDIXB 
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BUSINESSOWNERS 
BP 00 06 01 97 
BUSINESSOWNERS LIABILITY COVERAGE FORM 
Various provisions in this policy restrict coverage. 
Read the entire policy carefully to determine rights, 
duties and what is and is not covered . 
Throughout this policy the words "you" and "your" 
refer to the Named Insured shown in the Declara-
tions. The words "we","us" and "our" refer to the 
Company providing this insurance. 
The word "insured" means any person or organiza-
tion qualifying as such under Section C - Who Is An 
Insured. 
Other words and phrases that appear in quotation 
marks have special meaning. Refer to Section F -
Liabili1y And Medical Expenses Definitions. 
A. Coverages 
1. Business Liability 
a. We will pay 1hose sums that the insured 
becomes legally obligated to pay as dam-
ages because of "bodily injur:y", "property 
damage", "personal injury" or "advertising 
injury" to which this insurance applies. 
We will have the right and duty to defend 
the insured against any "suit" seeking 
those damages. However, we will have no 
duty to defend the insured against any 
"suit" seeking damages for "bodily injury", 
"property damage", "personal injury", or 
"advertising injury" to which this insur-
ance does not apply. We may at our dis-
cretion, investigate any "occurrence" and 
settle any claim or "suit" that may result. 
But: 
(1) The amount we will pay for damages 
is limited as described in Section D -
Liability And Medical Expenses Limits 
Of Insurance; and 
(2) Our right and duty to defend end when 
we have used up the applicable limit 
of insurance in the payment of judg-
ments or settlements or medical ex-
penses. 
No other obligation or liability to pay sums 
or perform acts or services is covered 
unless explicitly provided for under Cov-
erage Extension .- Supplementary Pay-
ments. 
b. This insurance applies: 
(1) To "bodily injury" and "property dam-
age" only if: 
(a) The "bodily injury" or "property 
damage" is caused by an "occur-
rence" that takes place in the "cov-
erage territory": and 
(b) The "bodily injury" or "property 
damage" occurs during the policy 
period. 
(2) To: 
(a) "Personal injury" caused by an of-
fense arising out of your business, 
excluding advertising, publishing , 
broadcasting or telecasting done by 
or for you; 
(b) "Advertising injury" caused b~ an 
offense committed in the course of 
advertising your goods, products or 
services; 
but only if the offense was committed 
in the "coverage territory" during the 
policy period. 
c. Damages because of "bodily injury" in-
clude damages claimed by any person or 
organization for care, loss of services or 
death resulting at any time from the "bod-
ily injury" . 
d. Coverage Extension - Supplementary Pay-
ments 
In addition to the Limit of Insurance we 
will pay, with respect to any claim we in-
vestigate or settle, or any "suit" against 
an insured we defend: 
(1) All expenses we incur. 
(2) Up to $250 for cost of bail bonds re-
quired because of accidents or traffic 
law violations arising out of the use of 
any vehicle to which Business Liability 
Coverage for "bodily injury" applies. 
We do not have to furnish these bonds. 
(3) The cost of bonds to release attach-
ments, but only for bond amounts 
within our Limit of Insurance. We do 
not have to furnish these bonds. 
BP 00 06 01 97 Copyright, Insurance Services Office, Inc., 1997 
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2. Medical Expenses 
a. We will pay medical expenses as de-
scribed below for "bodily injury" caused 
by an accident: 
(1) On premises you own or rent; 
(2) On ways next to premises you own or 
rent; or 
(3) Because of your operations; 
provided that: 
(a) The accident takes place in the 
"coverage territory" and during the 
policy period; 
(b) The expenses are incurred and re-
ported to us within one year of the 
date of the accident; and 
(c) The injured person submits to ex-
amination, at our expense, by phy-
sicians of our choice as often as we 
reasonably require. 
b. We will make these payments regardless 
of fault. These payments will not exceed 
the Limit of Insurance. We will pay rea-
sonable expenses for: 
(1) First aid administered at the time of an 
accident; 
(2) Necessary medical, surgical, x-ray and 
dental services, including prosthetic 
devices; and 
(3) Necessary ambulance, hospital, pro-
fessional nursing and funeral services . 
B. Exclusions 
1. Applicable To Business Liability Coverage 
This insurance does not apply to: 
a. Expected Or Intended Injury 
"Bodily injury" or "property damage" ex-
pected or intended from the standpoint of 
the insured. This exclusion does not apply 
to "bodily injury" resulting from the use of 
reasonable force to protect persons or 
property. 
b. Contractual Liability 
"Bodily injury" or "property damage" for 
which the insured is obligated to pay 
damages by reason of the assumption of 
liability in a contract or agreement. This 
exclusion does not apply to liability for 
damages: 
(1) That the insured would have in the ab-
sence of the contract or agreement; or 
(2) Assumed in a contract or agreement 
that is an "insured contract", provided 
the "bodily injury" or "property dam-
age" occurs subsequent to the exe-
cution of the contract or agreement. 
Solely for the purposes of liability as-
sumed in an "insured contract", rea-
sonable attorney fees and necessary 
litigation expenses incurred by or for 
a party other than an insured are 
deemed to be damages because of 
"bodily injury" or "property damage", 
provided: 
(a) Liability to such party for, or for the 
cost of, that party's defense has 
also been assumed in the same 
"insured contract"; and 
(b) Such attorney fees and litigation 
expenses are for defense of that 
party against a civil or alternative 
dispute resolution proceeding in 
which damages to which this insur-
ance applies are alleged. 
c. Liquor Liability 
"Bodily injury" or "property damage" for 
which any insured may be held liable by 
reason of: 
(1) Causing or contributing to the 
intoxication of any person; 
(2) The furnishing of alcoholic beverages 
to a person under the legal drinking 
age or under the influence of alcohol; 
or 
(3) Any statute, ordinance or regulation 
relating to the sale, gift, distribution or 
use of alcoholic beverages. 
This exclusion applies only if you are in 
the business of manufacturing, distribut-
ing, selling, serving or furnishing alcoholic 
beverages. 
d. Workers' Compensation And Similar Laws 
Any obligation of the insured under a 
workers' compensation, disability benefits 
or unemployment compensation law or 
any similar law. 
BP 00 06 01 97 Copyright, Insurance Services Office, Inc., 1997 
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(8) Body piercing services; and 
(9) Services in the practice of pharmacy; 
but this exclusion does not apply to an 
insured whose operations include 
those of a retail druggist or drugstore. 
k. Damage To Property 
"Property damage" to: 
(1) Property you own, rent or occupy; 
(2) Premises you sell, give away or aban-
don, if the "property damage" arises 
out of any part of those premises; 
(3) Property loaned to you; 
(4) Personal property in the care, custody 
or control of the insured; 
(5) That particular part of real property on 
which you or any contractor or sub-
contractor working directly or indirectly 
on your behalf is performing oper-
ations, if the "property damage" arises 
out of those operations; or 
(6) That particular part of any property that 
must be restored, repaired or replaced 
because "your work" was incorrectly 
performed on it. 
Paragraph (2) of this exclusion does not 
apply if the premises are "your work" and 
were never occupied, rented or held for 
rental by you. 
Paragraphs (3), (4), (5) and (6) of this ex-
clusion do not apply to liability assumed 
under a sidetrack agreement. 
Paragraph (6) of this exclusion does not 
apply to "property damage" included in 
the "products - completed operations 
hazard". 
I. Damage To Your Product 
"Property damage" to "your product" aris-
ing out of it or any part of it. 
m. Damage To Your Work 
"Property damage" to "your work" arising 
out of it or any part of it and included in 
the "products - completed operations 
hazard". 
This exclusion does not apply if the dam-
aged work or the work out of which the 
damage arises was performed on your 
behalf by a subcontractor. 
n. Damage To Impaired Property Or Property 
Not Physically Injured 
"Property damage" to "impaired property" 
or property that has not been physically 
injured, arising out of: 
(1) A defect, deficiency, inadequacy or 
dangerous condition in "your product" 
or "your work"; or 
(2) A delay or failure by you or anyone 
acting on your behalf to perform a 
contract or agreement in accordance 
with its terms. 
This exclusion does not apply to the loss 
of use of other property arising out of 
sudden and accidental physical injury to 
"your product" or "your work" after it has 
been put to its intended use. 
o. Recall Of Products, Work Or Impaired 
Property 
Damages claimed for any loss, cost or 
expense incurred by you or others for the 
loss of use, withdrawal, recall, inspection, 
repair, replacement, adjustment, removal 
or disposal of: 
(1) "Your product"; 
(2) "Your work"; or 
(3) "Impaired property"; 
if such product, work or property is with-
drawn or recalled from the market or from 
use by any person or organization be-
cause of a known or suspected defect, 
deficiency, inadequacy or dangerous con-
dition in it. 
p. Personal Or Advertising Injury 
"Personal injury" or "advertising injury": 
(1) Arising out of oral or written publica-
tion of material, if done by or at the di-
rection of the insured with knowledge 
of its falsity; 
(2) Arising out of oral or written publica-
tion of material whose first publication 
took place before the beginning of the 
policy period; 
Page 6 of 15 Copyright, Insurance Services Office, Inc., 1997 
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b. If a claim is made or "suit" is brought 
against any insured, you must: 
(1) Immediately record the specifics of the 
claim or "suit" and the date received; 
and 
(2) Notify us as soon as practicable. 
You must see to it that we receive written 
notice of the claim or "suit" as soon as 
practicable. 
c. You and any other involved insured must: 
(1) Immediately send us copies of any de-
mands, notices, summonses or legal 
papers received in connection with the 
claim or "suit"; 
(2) Authorize us to obtain records and 
other information; 
(3) Cooperate with us in the investigation, 
or settlement of the claim or defense 
against the "suit" ; and 
(4) Assist us, upon our request, in the 
enforcement of any right against any 
person or organization that may be li-
able to the insured because of injury 
or damage to which this insurance may 
also apply. 
d. No insured will, except at that insured's 
own cost, voluntarily make a payment, 
assume any obligation, or incur any ex-
pense, other than for first aid, without our 
consent. 
3. Financial Responsibility Laws 
a. When this policy is certified as proof of fi-
nancial responsibility for the future under 
the provisions of any motor vehicle finan-
cial responsibility law, the insurance pro-
vided by the policy for "bodily injury" 
liability and "property damage" liability 
will comply with the provisions of the law 
to the extent of the coverage and limits of 
insurance required by that law. 
b. With respect to "mobile equipment" to 
which this insurance applies, we will pro-
vide any liability, uninsured motorists, 
underinsured motorists, no-fault or other 
coverage required by any motor vehicle 
law. We will provide the required limits for 
those coverages. 
4. Legal Action Against Us 
No person or organization has a right under 
this policy: 
a. To join us as a party or otherwise bring 
us into a "suit" asking for damages from 
an insured; or 
b. To sue us on this policy unless all of its 
terms have been fully complied with . 
A person or organization may sue us to re-
cover on an agreed settlement or on a final 
judgment against an insured obtained after 
an actual trial; but we will not be liable for 
damages that are not payable under the 
terms of this policy or that are in excess of 
the applicable limit of insurance. An agreed 
settlement means a settlement and release 
of liability signed by us, the insured and the 
claimant or the claimant's legal represen-
tative. 
5. Separation Of Insureds 
Except with respect to the Limits of Insurance, 
and any rights or duties specifically assigned 
in this policy to the first Named Insured, this 
insurance applies: 
a. As if each Named Insured were the only 
Named Insured; and 
b. Separately to each insured against whom 
claim is made or "suit'' is brought. 
F. Liability And Medical Expenses Definitions 
1. "Advertising injury" means injury arising out 
of one or more of the following offenses: 
a. Oral or written publication of material that 
slanders or libels a person or organization 
or disparages a person's or organization's 
goods, products or services; 
b. Oral or written publication of material that 
violates a person's right of privacy; 
c. Misappropriation of advertising ideas or 
style of doing business; or 
d. Infringement of copyright, title or slogan. 
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JUL 1 3 2017 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT Ot;'iJ!~~@f'R!CH, Clerk 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA Sy EMILY CHILO 
SCOUT, LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
company, doing business as Double Tap Pub, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FARMERS GROUP, INC., a California 
corporation; and TRUCK INSURANCE 
EXCHANGE, an inter-insurance exchange 





Case No. CVO 1-16-17560 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
ON CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
This is a dispute over whether Defendant, Truck Insurance Exchange ( .. Truck") breached 
its duty to defend its alleged insured, Scout LLC d/bla. Gone Rogue Pub, ("Scout") in a 
trademark infringement action brought over Scout's use of trademark "ROGUE" in the operation 
and advertisement of its restaurant/pub, Gone Rogue Pub .. In this action, Scout brought claims 
against Truck for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing and insurance bad faith. Both parties moved for summary judgment on the claims. 
Oral argument was held on the motions on May 30, 2017, after which the Court took the 
matter under advisement. 
II. STANDARD 
A motion for summary judgment must be granted if the movant shows, based on cited 
materials in the record, that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. IRCP 56(a), (c). The burden of proving the absence of a 
material fact rests at all times upon the moving party. McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 769-70, 
820 P .2d 360, 364-65 ( 1991 ). If the moving party challenges an element of the nonrnoving 
party's case on the.basis that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden then shifts to the 
nonmoving party to come forward with sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact. 
Smith v. Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2, 128 Idaho 714, 719, 918 P.2d 583, 588 (1996). To this 
APPENDIXC 000595 
end, the nonmoving party's case must not rest on mere speculation because a mere scintilla of 
evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue of fact. Id. A party against whom a motion for 
summary judgment is sought .. may not merely rest on allegations contained in his pleadings," but 
must establish the existence of a genuine issue of fact by citing to ponions of the record or 
through affidavits setting forth facts that arc admissible as evidence. Id.; IRCP 56(c). 
The standards for summary judgment further require the district court to liberally construe 
the facts in favor of the non-moving party and to draw all reasonable inferences from the record · 
in favor of the non-moving party. McCoy, 120 Idaho at 769, 820 P.2d at 364. This means that all 
doubts are to be resolved against the moving party, and the motion must be denied if the 
evidence is such that conflicting inferences may be drawn therefrom, and if reasonable people 
might reach different conclusions. Id. 
Ill. FACTS 
Scout was registered as an Idaho limited liability company on or around November 30, 
2011. Deel. Xayamahakham, 1 2. On or around October I, 2012, Scout purchased the assets of 
8th Street Bistro, LLC, which included a restaurant and bar operating as "Casa Del Sol" located 
in downtown Boise, Idaho ("Premises"). Id. at ii,i 5- l 0. Shortly thereafter, the members of Scout 
decided to rebrand the restaurant and bar and operate under the name "Gone Rogue Pub." Id. at 
ffll 11-13. On or around October 11, 2012, Scout posted to Facebook a picture of a "Gone Rogue 
Pub" logo that Scout was thinking about using. Id. at ffll 28-29, Exh. 7 ("October Post"). The text 
accompanying the logo post stated, "Here is our new logo! Signs are going up today and 
tomorrow! Hope everyone likes it! Let us know what you guys think!" Id. According to Pho, 
Scout posted the logo because it was "thinking about using" it and wanted to get feedback from 
followers. Deel. Xayamahakham, ,i 28. 
Thereafter, on or around October 16, 2012, Scout registered "Gone Rogue Pub" as an 
assumed business name for Scout with the Idaho Secretary of State. Id. at ~ 13-14, Exh. 4. 
Scout did not post any other pictures of the logo or otherwise advertise the name "Gone Rogue 
Pub" on its Fa~cbook page or through any other media until November 7, 2012. Id. at ffll 28-32. 
Prior to opening for business on or about October 23, 2012, Pho Xayamahakham ("Pho"), 
on behalf of Scout, contacted Theresa Vinccnt-Leitennan, an agent for Truck Insurance 
Exchange ("Truck"), to request a commercial business insurance policy for Scout. Id. at ffll 16-
18. Pho informed Ms. Vincent-Leiterman that Scout would be operating a restaurant and pub 
2 
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under the assumed business name "Gone Rogue Pub", filled out an information sheet for Scout. 
Id. at ,MJ 16-22. Between October 23, 2012 and November 7, 2012, at the request of Ms. Vincent-
Leitennan and assumedly in order to obtain the Policy, Pho provided Ms. Vincent-Leitennan, 
multiple documents including copies of Scout's Certificate of Organization, the Gone Rogue 
Certificate of Assumed Business Name, the Lease Agreement between Foster Family Limited 
Partnership, Melinda L. Foster, General Partner and Scout LLC ("Scout Lease"), and the 
occupancy permits and licenses issued to Scout, dba as Gone Rogue Pub, by the City of Boise 
and Ada County. Id. at ,Mi t 6- t 8, Exh.4-6. After providing the requisite business records and 
completing the required inspections of the Premises, Truck issued a business liability insurance 
policy ("Policy"), with an effective coverage date beginning November 7, 2012. 1 Aff. Thomson, 
Exh. B (Policy). Scout paid all premiums due under the Policy. Deel. Xayamahakham, ,i 22. 
The first section of the Policy identifies Pho, his wife, Sakpraseuth Outhinh, and "Gone 
Rogue" as the named insureds, lists the Prenuses as the insureds' address, identifies the type of 
business insured as a "Restaurant," and describes the Policy Coverage as a "Businessowners Policy" 
and "Employment Practices Insurance Coverage." Policy, pp. 23, 27. While Pho did not personally 
complete the insurance application or.draft the language of the Policy, he was assured at all time 
by Ms. Vincent-Lcitennan that the Policy would and did provide the requested coverage for 
Scout as it did business as Gone Rogue Pub. Deel. Xayamahakham, 111 16-27. 
Scout obtained the necessary alcohol licenses and pennits from the Boise City and 
Ada County on or around November 15, 2012. Id. at ,Mi 33-34, Exh. 9. Scout hung its outdoor 
signage on November 19, 2012, obtained merchandise and glassware bearing the logo "Gone 
Rogue Pub" on November 20, 2012, and opened for.business on or about November 21, 2012. 
Id. at fl 35-40 and Exhs. 10, 11. 
Two years later, on October 14, 2014, Scout, dba Gone Rogue Pub, was sued by Oregon 
Brewing Company ("OBC"). Aff. Thomas, Exh. A, p. 3 (OBC Complaint). The OBC Complaint 
alleged that OBC had continuously used the mark "ROGUE" in commerce in the name of a 
ROGUE-branded line of restaurants and brew pubs, as well as for alcoholic beverages, and that 
OBC owed five federal trademark registrations for "Beer and Ale"; "Restaurant, pub and 
catering services"; "Beverage glassware"; "Beer"; and "Clothing." OBC alleged that it had been 
1 The Policy wai1 applied for on October 23, 2012 but did not become ctTec1ive unlil November 7, 2012. Thomson 
Aff. , Ex. A. The Policy was automatically renewed on November 7, 2013. 
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advertising and selling its well-known ROGUE lagers, ales, porters and stouts in Idaho for over 
fifteen years. OBC asserted that "(i]n October of 2012, long after OBC's first use apd 
registration of the mark ROGUE, Defendants commenced use of the mark ROGUE as the name 
of their restaurant and bar ('Gone Rogue Pub')." Id. at ,i 14. Attached as exhibits to the OBC 
Complaint were various examples of Scout's use of the ROGUE mark, including a screen shot of 
the October Post. Id. at Exh A, p. 73. OBC asserted various claims against Scout for its violation 
of OBC's five different trademark rcgistrations2 and sought injunctive relief, attorney fees and 
costs, and treble damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117 and I.C. § 48-514. Id., p. 10. 
The Policy provides coverage for "those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated 
to pay as damages because of ... 'advertising injury' ... caused by an offense committed in the 
course of advertising your goods, product or services; but only if the offense was committed in 
the 'coverage territory' during the policy period." Policy, § A( 1 )b(2)(b). An ''advertising injury" 
is defined as, inter alia, "[m]isappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business" or 
"infringement of copyright, title or slogan." Id. at§ F(l )(c), (d). Excluded from coverage under 
the Policy is "advertising injury" "arising out of oral or written publication of material whose 
first publication took place before the beginning of the policy period[.]" ("Prior Publication 
exclusion") Id. at § 8( I )(p)(2). 
On December 3, 2014, Scout's counsel sent a letter to Truck informing it of the OBC 
lawsuit and requesting coordination for representation of Scout and Pho. Deel. Tipton, Exh. A. 
On December 23, 2014, Truck responded, indicating there was a ''possibility" the claim was not 
covered and requested a conference with Plaintiff's counsel about its investigation. Id. at Exh. B. 
A conference was held between Plaintitrs counsel and Truck's claims examiner and, on January 
9, 2015, Plaintiffs counsel sent a follow-up letter to Truck which explained that a factual 
allegation in the OBC Complaint- namely, that the violation began in October of 2012- was 
incorrect because Gone Rogue Pub did not open for business until commence operations until 
after the Policy took effect. Id. at Exh. C. Enclosed with the letter were documents evidencing 
that Gone Rogue Pub did not receive its alcohol permits until November 14, 2012. /d. 
2 Specifically, the OBC Complaint alleged Trademark Counterfeiting Under Tbe Lanham Act (IS U.S.C. § 1114); 
Trademark Infringement, Unfair Competition and False Designation of Origin Under The Lanham Act (IS U.S.C. § 
1114); Trademark Infringement, Unfair Competition and False Designation of Origin Under The Lanham Act (1 S 
U.S.C. § 1125); Cyber-squatting Under The Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. § I 12S): Unfair Business Practices Under Idaho 
law (I.C. § 48-601 et seq.); and Common Law Trademark Infringement (I.C. § 48-SOO et lleq.). 
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On January 16, 2015, Truck sent a letter denying coverage and a defense for the OBC 
Lawsuit based on the fact that: ( 1) Scout was not a named insured under the Policy; (2) the 
"advertising injury" arose out of publications that were first published in October of 2012 and, 
therefore, was excluded by the Prior Publication exclusion, and; (3) the Policy did not cover the 
damages sought in the OBC Complaint. Id. at Exh. D. 
On March 26, 2015, Scout entered into a Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release 
("Settlement") with OBC to settle the OBC lawsuit. Id., Ex. J. As part of the Settlement, Scout 
agreed to abandon its use of the word "Rogue" and in August of2015 changed is business name 
from "Gone Rogue Pub" to "Double Tap Pub." Id. On September 20, 2016, Scout filed the 
instant action. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
Truck cites three separate bases for judgment in its favor: I) only Gone Rogue Pub-not 
Scout- w.as a named insured and, therefore, Truck had no duty to defend the infringement suit 
against Scout; 2) coverage for the "advertising injury" was excluded under the Prior Publication 
exclusion, and; 3) the Policy does not provide coverage for the damages sought by OBC. 
Scout, in tum, argues that: I ) because Gone Rogue Pub is a named insured under the 
policy and Scout is the legal entity doing business as Gone Rogue Pub, Scout is necessarily 
insured as well; 2) the Prior Publication exclusion does not apply, and; 3) whether or not 
damages in the lawsuit would ultimately be Truck's responsibility does not affect its duty to 
defend. 
A. Scout Is a Named Insured. 
The determination of whether Scout is insured under the Policy requires ascertaining the 
distinction, if any, between a business and its trade name. At the time the Policy was issued, 
assumed business names were governed by The Assumed Business Names Act of 1997, Idaho 
Code§§ 53-501 ct. seq.3 Pursuant to I.C. 53-503(1 )(a), an "assumed business name" was 
defined as "(a]ny name other than the true name of any formally organized or registered entity, 
under which name the entity holds itself out for the transaction of business in the state of 
Idaho[.]" Importantly, because an assumed business name is nothing more than another name for 
a recognized legal entity, the filing of a certificate of assumed busin~s name does not create a 
' Idaho Code§§ 53-501 was replaced in 2015 with the comparable provisions ofl.C. § 30-21-801. et. seq. 
5 
APPENDIXC 000599 
separate legal entity. Salazar v. Tilley. 110 Idaho 584, 716 P .2d 1356, 1357 n. 1 (Ct.App.1986); 
O'Banion v. Select Portfolio Servs., Inc., 2011 WL 5572625, at •9 (D. Idaho Nov. 16, 2011 ). 
Idaho law, like the majority of states, recognizes that, ''in the absence of statutory 
prohibition, a corporation may conduct business and enter into a valid contract under an assumed 
name." W.l. Scott. Inc. v. Madras Aerotech, /nc~, 103 Idaho 736,739,653 P.2d 791, 794 (1982). 
This includes insurance c~ntracts. 3 Couch on Ins.§ 40:4 (3rd ed., updated Dec. 2016)( .. An 
individual may contract for insurance using a trade name."). Because a trade name is not a legal 
entity, many courts have determined that, in such cases, the legal entity behind the trade name is 
the insured under policies listing the insured by a trade name. Gen. Cas. Co. of Wis. v. Outdoor 
Concepts, 661 N.W.2d 441,444 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003)(collecting cases). 
For example, in O'Hanlon v. Hartford Accident & lndem. Co., the plaintiff sought 
uninsured motorist coverage under his policy after his son suffered serious injuries. The policy 
agreed to cover "the Named Insured ... and, while residents of the same household, 
the ... relatives of[the Named lnsured]." 639 F.2d 1019, 1026 (3d Cir.1981). The policy 
designated the named insured as .. Coe Management Company," the trade name under which 
plaintiff operated his business. Id. at 1021. In conducting its analysis, the Third Circuit stated 
that "an insured's trade name and given name should be equated'' and that "where an insured 
purchases a policy in a trade name, the policy will be viewed as if issued in his given name." Id. 
at 1025.4 
Here, the Declarations Page lists the Named Insured as Pho-an individual-and 
identifies the type of business being insured as a "restaurant." Through an endorsement, Pho's 
wife and "Gone Rogue" were added as Named Insureds. While "Gone Rogue" is not specifically 
identified as an assumed business name, it is not identified as an independent legal entity either. 
Rather, the evidence establishes that the legal entity behind the "Gone Rogue" trade name has 
4 See also, Simmons, .. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 17 P.3d 56, 62 (Alaska 2001) (when a business owner acquirel4 insurance 
in his trade name, coverage ell tends to the owner a.-i well a.'I the business); Chmiell!wski v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 
591 A.2d 10 I. 113 {Conn. 1991) (stating that "one who operates a business under a trade name is nonetheless an 
individual insured under a policy issued in that trade name".); Purcell,•. Allstate Ins. Co., 310 S.E.2d 530, 531- 533 
(Ga. App. 1983) (businel!S auto liability policy naming "Purcell Radiator Serv." as the insured applied to individual 
operating under that trade name and, by extension, to his family member injured by an unin!lured motorist); Sterling 
, .. Ohio Cas. Ins. C"·· 936 So. 2d 43, 47 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (stating that when insurance is iSllued to a 
pannership or in the trade name of the owner of a business, coverage usually extends to the family members of the 
panncr.i or owner); P<11revito 1•. Country Mut. Ins. Co. 118 Ill.App. 3rd 573, 74 Ill.Dec. 259, 455 N.E.2d 289 (3d 
Dist.1983) {concluding an insurance policy is.'lued to "Patrevito's Florist & Greenhouse," an unincorporated 
bu.~incss, covered its owner.) 
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always been Scout and, therefore, Scout must be considered the "Named Insured." To find 
otherwise would be illogical. Because "Gone Rogue" has no legal existence complete in itself, 
there is no need for it to be independently insured. Further, it has no ability to enter into an 
insurance contrc1ct in the first place. Its designation as a Named Insured becomes meaningful 
only in reference to the entity actually operating it, which is Scout. Therefore, Truck's argument 
that "Gone Rogue" is a Named Insured but Scout is not is not a reasonable interpretation of the 
Policy. Consequently, the Policy is not ambiguous and this Court finds as a matter oflaw that 
Scout is a Named Insured. 5 
8. The OBC Complaint Did Not Trigger a Duty to Defend 
Truck's second argument in support of summary judgment is that, even if Scout were a 
Named Insured, the allegations within the four comers of the OBC Complaint did not give rise to 
a duty to defend. Namely, since the OBC Complaint alleged that t~e first publication of"Gone 
Rogue Pub" occurred in October of 2012-prior to the effective date of the Policy-and 
provided evidence of the publication through an exhibit to the OBC Complaint, Truck argues it 
properly declined the defense pursuant to the Prior Publication exclusion. 
Scout disputes that Truck can avoid its duty to defend by relying solely on the allegations 
in the OBC Complaint. Rather, Scout asserts that Truck must also consider known extrinsic facts 
outside the OBC Complaint in determining whether it has a duty to defend. Namely, Scout 
arbrues that Truck's duty to defend consideration should have accounted for the information later 
conveyed by Scout's counsel to Truck's claim representative that Gone Rogue Pub was not even 
operating until the latter part of November of 2012-after coverage became effective-and, 
therefore, the October 2012 post was not an injurious publication within the scope of the Prior 
Publication exclusion. 
5 Even assuming, arguendo, that the Policy were ambiguous as to the identities of the Named Insureds, ambiguities 
are to be construed most strongly against the in,;un:d. Armstrong v. Farmer.~ Ins. Co. of Idaho. 14 7 Idaho 6 7. 69- 70, 
205 P.3d 1203, 1205 06 (2009). Therefore, the Court would reach the same conclusion that Scout is a Named 
ln!,ured. Additionally. where an insurer- through iL,; agent- knows the true name of the insured but issues a policy 
in a trade name or assumed name, the insurer will not be permitted to deny liability on the basis of that designation. 
3 Couch on Ins.§ 40:4 (3nt ed., updated Dec. 2016). The undisputed facts establish that Pho infonned Truck's agent 
Iha& Scout was going to operate a restaurant and bar under the assumed business name of"Gone Rogue Pub" and 
provided her wilh Scout's certificate of organization, lhe Gone Rogue ABN, the lca!IC agreement for the Gone 
Rogue Pub space, which wa.,i executed by Scout, and the alcohol license issued to Scout dba Gone Rogue Pub. Deel. 




These arguments raise two issues: I) whether Truck was required to look to facts beyond 
the allegations in the OBC Complaint in determining its duty to defend, and; 2) the application of 
the Prior Publication exclusion. 
I. A Duty to Defend is Defined by Allegations of the Underlying Complaint. 
Idaho has long held that the duty to defend "arises upon the filing of a complaint whose 
allegations, in whole or in part, read broadly, reveal a potential for liability that would be 
covered by the insured's policy." County of Boise v. Idaho Counties Risk Mgmt. Program, 
Underwriters, l SI Idaho 90 I, 904, 265 P .3d 514, 517 (2011 ); Kootenai County v. W Cas. and 
Sur. Co., 113 Idaho 908, 910-11, 750 P.2d 87, 89-90 (1988). The duty to defend arises only 
where an insurance policy provides that the insurer has a duty to defend against the specific type 
of claim alleged. Dave's, Inc. v. Linford, 153 Idaho 744, 748, 291 P.3d 427, 431 (2012). Stated 
another way, ''[f]or there to be a duty to defend, the complaint's allegations, in whole or in part, 
when read broadly, must allege a claim to which the duty to defend applies under the terms of 
the insurance policy." Id. "If the complaint discloses no possibility of coverage, the insurer may 
properly decline to defend against it." County of Boise, supra. However, if there is doubt as to 
whether a theory of recovery pied within the complaint is covered under the policy, the insurer 
must defend regardless of potential defenses arising under the policy. Kootenai County, supra. 
Where an insurance policy clearly excludes certain types of claims from coverage, a duty 
to defend those claims does not arise. Dave ·s. Inc., 153 Idaho at 749-50, 291 P.3d at 432- 33 
(finding no duty to defend a contractor's action against homeowner brought as a breach of 
contract claim under a "because of ... property damage" provision "to which this coverage 
applies" because the policy excluded property damage to the home); County of Boise, 151 Idaho 
at 905, 265 P .3d at 517 ( finding no duty to defend where lawsuit arose out of or was connected 
with land use regulation or planning and zoning activities which were specifically excluded 
under policy).6 
6 Scout argues that any time an insurer believes coverage is excluded under the policy by a policy exclusion, the 
insurer must undenake the defense and then tile a declaratory judgment action to establish the application of the 
exclusion. However, the Idaho Supreme Coun has unequivocally stated that ''the insurer may not be requiJ"e4 to 
defend if it can establish that the exclusion contained in the policy is clear and unambiguous." Con.fir. Mgmt. SyJ .• 
Inc. l '. As.vurance Co. of Am., 13S Idaho 680,684, 23 P.3d 142, 146 (2001). 
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However, where a claim presents a fact pattern arguably within the policy, and the 
application of an exclusion presents a fairly debatable question of law or fact, the insurer has a 
duty to defend its insured until that question is resolved. Black v. Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Co., 
115 Idaho 449,457, 767 P.2d 824, 832 (Ct. App. t 989) ... The proper procedure for the insurer to 
take is to evaluate the claims and determine whether an arguable potential exists for a claim 
covered by the policy; if so, then the insurer must immediately step in and defend the suit. At the 
same time, if the insurer believes that the policy itself provides a basis for noncovcrage through 
an exclusion, it may seek declaratory relief." Deluna v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 149 Idaho 
81, 85, 233 P .3d 12, 16 (2008), quoting Kootenai County, 113 Idaho at 911, 750 P .2d at 90. 
In recent years, the Court has uniformly held that "[a]n insurer does not have to look 
beyond the words of the complaint to determine if a possibility of coverage exists." Hoyle v. 
Utica Mm. Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 367, 373, 48 P.3d 1256, 1262 (2002), citing Construction 
Management v. Assurance Company of America. 135 Idaho 680, 23 P.3d 142 (2001). In Hoyle, 
the insured argued that because the facts behind the underlying complaint potentially gave rise to 
an action for negligence-which would be covered by the policy- the insurer had a duty to 
defend. The Court rejected the argument, holding that: I) the complaint made no express claim 
for negligence, and 2) even if facts behind the underlying complaint ''might disclose negligent 
acts, it is irrelevant" since an insurer need not look beyond the words of the underlying 
complaint. Id.; see also AMCO Ins. Co. v. Tri-Spur Im•. Co .. 140 Idaho 733, 738, 101 P.3d 226, 
231 (2004)(holding that even if facts behind a complaint may give rise to covered claims, the 
facts are irrelevant to insurer's duty to defend.) · 
Relying on earlier Idaho precedent, Scout argues that an insurer must also consider facts 
outside the underlying complaint in determining whether it has a duty to defend. To this end, 
Scout relies primarily on Pendlebury v. W. Cas. & Sur. Co., 89 Idaho 456,464,406 P.2d 129, 
134 ( 1965) and State of Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co .. 647 F. Supp. 1064, I 068 (D. Idaho t 986). 
However, these cases are factually distinguishable. Both pertain to situations where the 
complaint initially states a claim against the insured which is potentially covered- thereby 
triggering the duty to defend- but then later-developed facts reveal that the claim falls outside of 
covt..-rage, which would then allow the insun.-r to revoke the duty to defend through a separate 
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declaratory judgment proceeding. In other words, facts beyond the underlying complaint are 
pertinent to the continuing duty to defend, but not to the initial duty to defend. 7 
On the initial duty to defend-which is at issue here-the more recent case law cited 
herein unequivocally holds that the duty is solely dependent on the broadly construed allegations 
of the underlying complaint. Thus, following this precedent, the Court will ascertain whether 
Truck's duty to defend was triggered based on the allegations of the OBC Complaint. 
2. The Prior Publication Exclusion Unambiguously Excludes Coverage. 
The OBC Complaint asserts that Scout's use of the mark "ROGUE" violated OBC's five 
different trademark registrations of the mark for: "Beer and Ale"; "Restaurant, pub and catering 
services"; "Beverage glassware"; "Beer"; and "Clothing." OBC Cmplt., ,i 9. Notably, the OBC 
Complaint alleges that "In October 2012, long after OBC's first use and registration of the mark 
ROGUE, Defendants commenced use of the mark ROGUE as the name of their restaurant and 
bar ('Gone Rogue Pub')." Id., ,i 14. Attached to the OBC Complaint as an exhibit is the October 
Post. 
The Policy provides coverage for ''those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated 
to pay as damages because of ... 'advertising injury' ... caused by an offense committed in the 
course of advertising your goods, product or services; but only if the offense was committed in 
the 'coverage territory' during the policy period." Policy, § A(l )b(2)(b). An "advertising injury" 
is defined as, inter a/ia, "[m]isappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business" or . 
"infringement of copyright, title or slogan." Id. at § f( I)( c ), ( d). The Prior Publication exclusion 
excludes "advertising injury" "arising out of oral or written publication of material whose first 
publication took place before the beginning of the policy period[.]" Id. at § B( I )(p)(2). 
The parties do not dispute that Scout's use of the "ROGUE" mark constitutes an 
"advertising injury" which would otherwise be covered under the Policy. However, the issue is 
whether the allegations of the OBC Complaint, when read broadly, trigger the Prior Publication 
exclusion. To this end, Truck bears the burden of establishing that the Prior Publication 
exclusion clearly and unambiguously excludes coverage. Construction Management, 135 Idaho 
at 684, 23 P.3d at 146. Stated another way, Truck must establish that the exclusion, as applied to 
7 Indeed. in Kootenai County, the Idaho Supreme Court cited approvingly to Bunker Hill, pointing out if it is 
"foreseeable" to the insurer that the claim against the insured could be covered, the inllurer ha.<1 a duty to defend 
unless and until the "unfolding of litigation" reveals facts which place the claim outside coverage. 113 Idaho at 911, 
750 P.2d at 90. 
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the allegations in the OBC Complaint, does not present a "fairly debatable question of law or 
fact." Black, 115 Idaho at 457, 767 P.2d at 832. 
a. The Prior Publication exclusion is unambiguous. 
Insurance policies are a contract between the insurer and the insured. Mortensen v. 
Stewart Title Guar. Co., 149 Idaho 437,442,235 P.3d 387,392 (2010), citing Hall v. Farmers 
Alliance Mut. Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 313, 318, 179 P.3d 276, 280 (2008). When interpreting 
insurance policies, a court is to apply the general rules of contract law subject to certain special 
canons of construction. Armstrong v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 147 Idaho 67, 69-70, 205 P.3d 
1203, 1205- 06 (2009), quoting Arreguin v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 145 Idaho 459,461, 180 
P.3d 498,500 (2008). Whether an insurance policy is ambiguous is a question of law. Id., 
quoting Purvis v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co .. 142 Idaho 2 I 3, 216, 127 P .3d 116, 119 (2005). 
Where policy lan~'Uage is found to be unambiguous, a court is to construe the policy as 
written, .. and the Court by construction cannot create a liability not assumed by the insurer nor 
make a new contract for the parties, or one different from that plainly intended, nor add words to 
the contract of insurance to either create or avoid liability." Id., quoting Pun•is, supra . .. Unless 
contrary intent is shown, common, non-technical words are given the meaning applied by 
laymen in daily usage-as opposed to the meaning derived from legal usage-in order to 
. effectuate the intent of the parties." Id., quoting Howard v. Oregon Mut. Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 214, 
2 I 7, 46 P .3d 510, 513 (2002). In deciding whether a particular provision is ambiguous, the 
provision must be read within the context in which it occurs in the policy. Id., citing Purvis, 
supra. An insurance policy provision is ambiguous if "it is reasonably subject to conflicting 
interpretations." N. Pac. Ins. Co. v. Mai, 130 Idaho 251, 253, 939 P.2d 570, 572 ( 1997). Words 
in an insurance policy that have a settled legal meaning are not ambiguous merely because the 
policy docs not contain a definition. Id. 
Because insurance contracts are adhesion contracts that are not typically subject to 
negotiation between the parties, any ambiguity that exists in the contract is construed most 
strongly against the insurer and in favor of the insured. Armstrong, 147 Idaho at 70,205 P.3d at 
1206, citing Arreguin 145 Idaho at 461, 180 P .3d at 500 ( .. A provision that seeks to exclude the 
insurer's coverage must be strictly construed in favor of the insured."). Further, insurance 
contracts are to be construed "in a light most favorable to the insured and in a manner which will 
provide full coverage for the indicated risks rather than to narrow its protection." Cascade Auto 
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Glass, Inc. v. Idaho Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 141 Idaho 660, 662, 115 P.3d 751, 753 (2005) ... The 
burden is on the insurer to use clear and precise language if it wishes to restrict the scope of its 
coverage." Arreguin, 145 Idaho at 461, 180 P.3d at 500. 
Although no Idaho appellate court has yet undertaken to interpret the Prior Publication 
exclusion found in the Truck policy, the identical exclusion has been held by other courts to be 
clear and unambiguous. See, e.g., United Nat. Ins. Co. v. Spectrum Worldwide, 555 F.3d 772, 
777 (9th Cir. 2009) ("Plainly reading the first publication exclusion and the relevant advertising 
injury definition together indicates that the parties intended to exclude from coverage any 
copyright infringement injury that arose from an oral or written publication of material first 
published before the policy became effective."); Hanover Ins. Co. v. Urban Out.fillers, Inc., 806 
F.3d 761, 767-68 (3d Cir. 2015); Capitol lndem. Corp. v. Elston SelfServ. Wholesale Groceries, 
Inc., 559 F.3d 616,620 (7th Cir. 2009).8 
The exclusion was recently analyzed by the Ninth Circuit in the case of Street Surfing. 
LLC v. Great Am. E & S Ins. Co .. 776 F.3d 603,610 (9th Cir. 2014)(applying California law). 
Initially, the court noted that the "straightforward purpose of this exclusion is to 'bar coverage' 
when the 'wrongful behavior ... beg[a]n prior to the effective date of the insurance policy."', 
quoting Taco Bell Corp. v. Cont'/ Cas. Co., 388 F.3d I 069, I 072 (7th Cir.2004) and citing Kim 
Seng Co. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 179 Cal.App.4th 1030 (2009)("The purpose of the prior 
publication exclusion is to preclude coverage for risks that have already materialized .... "). The 
court further explained: 
In the context of advertising injury coverage, an allegedly wrongful advertisement 
published before the coverage period triggers application of the prior publication 
exclusion. If this threshold showing is made, the exclusion bars coverage of 
injuries arising out of republication of that advertisement, or any substantially 
similar advertisement, during the policy period1 because such later publications 
are part of a single, continuing wrong that began before the insurance policy went 
into effect 
Id, cites omitted. 
Truck points out that OBC's claims against Scout arise directly from Scout's 
unauthorized use of the mark "ROUGE" in the operation of its restaurant and bar- a use which 
11 
See also, Scottsdale ln.s. Co. v. Sullfrun Properties, Inc., 2006 WL 505170, at •s (D. Haw. Feb. 28, 2006)(finding 
the exclusion unambiguously precludes coverage for Defendants' prior infringing use of the "Kapalua" name.) 
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was alleged to have begun prior to the effective date of the policy. According to Truck, these 
allegations place the claims squarely within the exclusion. Scout argues that the tenn 
"publication of material" in th<: Prior Publication exclusion refers only to an actionable 
publication of injurious material. 9 It argues that since the October Post only infringed on OBC's 
··Restaurant, pub and catering services" trademark, and Gone Rogue Pub was not even operating 
at the time of the post, the post could not have been injurious to OBC. On this point, Scout relies 
on the Seventh Circuit case of Capitol Indemnity Corp. v. Elston SelfSen•ice Wholesale 
Groceries. Inc., which stated: 
We understand the tenn "material" in the exclusion to refer to "injurious" 
material. By its terms, the prior publication exclusion abrogates the insurer's duty 
to defend only where it can prove that the insured's prior publication of the same 
actionable, injurious material alleged in the underlying complaint occurred prior 
to the beginning of its policy. This interpretation is logical because the exclusion 
exists to prevent an insured from purchasing an insurance policy to cover liability 
for illegal acts which it had undertaken prior to purchasing the policy. Put another 
way, the purpose of the exclusion is to prevent an individual who has caused an 
injury from buying insurance so that he can continue his injurious behavior. 
We do not see any ambiguity in the meaning of the exclusion; it seems clear that 
the exclusion only abrogates the duty to defend where the insured's first 
publication of actionable material occurred prior to the beginning of its policy. 
559 F.3d 616,620 (7th Cir.2009). 
Initially, Scout's argument relies on evidence outside the allegations of the OBC 
Complaint, which is irrelevant in considering whether an insurer has a duty to defend. Rather, as 
discussed, the duty to defend is framed solely by the allegations of the underlying complaint. 
Here, the OBC Complaint alleges that Scout's use of the "ROGUE" mark was unauthorized, the 
use commenced in October of 2012, and the use caused OBC harm. Thus, the OBC Complaint 
asserts a continuing course of infringing and injurious conduct since prior to the effective period 
of the policy. Whether or not Scout's October Post was actually injurious because Gone Rogue 
Pub was not yet open for business is not germane to the inquiry since injury beginning in 
October of 2012 was clearly alleged in the OBC Complaint. 
9 Alternatively, Scout argues that the exclusion is ambiguous because it does not expressly indicate whether the first 
publication of the material be injurious or actionable. 
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Further, even if facts extrinsic to the OBC Complaint were considered, i.e., that Gone 
Rogue Pub was not yet operation in October of 2012, the exclusion would still apply. To this 
end, the Court does not agree with Capito/ Indemnity's interpretation of the exclusion. Unless 
ambiguous, this Court must apply lh~ policy according to its plain language and not add words to 
either create or avoid liability. Armstrong, 147 Idaho at 69-70, 205 P.3d at 1205-06. The 
exclusion applies where the advertising injury "aris[ cs] out of ... written publication of material 
whose first publication took place before the beginning of the policy period." "Arise" is 
commonly defined as "to come into being, action or notice; originate; appear; spring up." 10 
Courts have broadly interpreted the phrase "arising out of' as used in insurance policies. In Fed. 
Jns. Co. v. Tri-State lns. Co., the Tenth Circuit Court examined the phrase "arising out of' as it is 
used in insurance policies in depth. 157 F .3d 800, 804 ( I 0th Cir. 1998). It held that " ... the 
general consensus [is] that the phrase "arising out of' should be given a broad reading such as 
"originating from" or "growing out of' or "flowing from" or "done in coMection with"- that is, 
it requires some causal connection to the injuries suffered, but docs not require proximate cause 
in the legal sense." Id. The Court's holding was based upon its analysis of case law throughout 
the country, as well as several treatises on insurance law. Id. The Court also held that the broad 
reading of the phrase "arising out of' is applicable to both inclusionary and exclusionary causes. 
Fed. Ins. Co., 157 F.3d at 804-805. 11 
Applying this broad definition of"arising out of' to the exclusion, it is evident that the 
first publication of material need not be independently "actionable" or "injurious" for the 
exclusion to apply. Rather, it need only be causally connected to the advertising injuries alleged. 
Stated another way, the advertising injuries alleged must flow from the first publication, but the 
first publication need not be the proximate cause of the injuries. To construe the provision as 
requiring that the first publication be independently injurious or actionable would not only ignore 
11 See also Jlugenherg v. West Am. Im. Co./Ohio Cas. Group, 249 S.W.3d 174, 186 87 (Ky. Ct App. 2006) 
("arising out of' means "originating from, or having its origin in, grounding out of or flowing from"); Taurus 
Holdings. Inc. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 913 So. 2d 528, 539-40 (Fla. 2005) ("arising out of' as Ul!Cd in a 
CGL policy exclusion unambiguous and broader in meaning than the tcnn "caused by'' and means "originating 
from," "having il'I origin in," "growing out of,'' "flowing from," "incident to'' or "having a coMection with"); 
Meadowbrook, In,·. , .. Tower Ins. Co .. Inc., SS9 N. W.2d 411, 419- 20 (Minn. 1997) ("arising out of' in a CGL 
insurance policy exclusion means "causally coMccted with" and not "proximately caUl!Cd by"): accord Records,,. 
Aetna Life & Cas. Ins., 683 A.2d 834 (N.J. Super. 1996), American Motori.~ts Ins. Co.,,. L-C-A Sales Co., 713 A.2d 
1007 (N.J. 1998). 
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the common definition of "arising out of' but would also insert words where they do not appear, 
which is contrary to Idaho's rules of contract interpretation. For this reason, the Court does not 
find Scout's interpretation reasonable and, therefore, does not find the exclusion ambiguous for 
the reason cited by Scout. 
Case law supports this Court's conclusion in this regard. In Matagorda Ventures, Inc. v. 
Travelers Lloyds ins. Co., the court concluded that the application of an identical exclusion does 
not hinge on whether the first publication was actionable, but rather on when the material giving 
rise to an actionable claim was first published. 203 F. Supp. 2d 704, 718 (S.D. Tex. 2000). 
Similar to Scout's argument, the insureds in Matagorda argued that the Prior Publication 
exclusion did not preclude coverage since some of the copyrights allegedly infringed upon were 
not registered when the prior publications took place and, therefore, the prior publications were 
not infringing. Id. at 717-18. The court found that argument unpersuasive, noting that "[t]he 
relevant question for the exclusion, however, is not when the claim first became actionable, but 
when the material giving rise to the claim was first published. The copyright infringement claim 
arose from "material whose first publication took place before the begiMing of the policy 
period." Id. Likewise, in Kim Seng Co. v. Great American bis. Co. of New York, the insured 
argued that the Court should consider whether its pre-policy-issuance publication gave rise to the 
.. likelihood of confusion" and constituted infringement when it was made. 179 Cal.App.4th 
1030, 1043 101 Cal.Rptr.3d 537,547 (2009), as modified on denial ofreh'g (Dec. 7, 2009). The 
Court declined, stating, "[w]e do not deal with whether there was an infringement, but rather 
whether there is coverage." Id. 
To the extent Capitol Indemnity holds that first publication of a mark be independently 
injurious or actionable, the holding is confined to the unique facts of that case and cannot be 
interpreted as requiring an insurer to evaluate whether the first alleged publication of a mark is 
independently actionable in determining its duty to defend. Capitol Indemnity involved a suit for 
trademark infringement based on the defendant's sale of counterfeit cigarettes displaying the 
Newport trademark. 559 F.3d at 619-20. Prior to the effective date of the policy, the defendant 
sold genuine Newport cigarettes with packaging and wrapping displaying the Newport marks. 
After the policy went into effect, however, the defendant began selling counterfeit cigarettes in 
the same packaging. id. The insurer argued that the Prior Publication exclusion barred 
coverage-and, therefore, abrogated its duty to defend- because the cigarette packaging and 
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wrapping containing the Newport mar_ks was first ''published" before the policy began. Id. at 
620. The court disagreed because the pre-policy publication was not actionable-the defendant 
was actually selling genuine Newport cigarettes. Id. The infringement alleged in the underlying 
complaint was the defendant's sale of counterfeit cigarettes with Nt:wport packaging, not the sale 
of genuine Newport cigarettes. Id. at 619. By contrast, OBC alleged that Scout's pre-policy 
publication of the Gone Rogue Pub logo in October of 2012 marked the origination date of 
Scout's acts that result in the infringement. Thus, Capitol Indemnity is not factually or legally 
applicable. 
b. The publications occurring during the coverage period were not fresh 
wrongs. 
Even if pre-coverage infringing advertisement triggers the applica~ion of the Prior 
Publication exclusion, some courts find that the exclusion will not apply to post-coverage 
advertisements which are sufficiently distinct from the pre-coverage advertisements. As 
explained by the Ninth Circuit, "[i]f a later advertisement is not substantially similar to the pre-
coverage advertisement, [ ... ), it constitutes a distinct, or 'fresh,' wrong that does not fall within 
the prior publication exclusion's scope." Street Su,fing, 776 F.3d at 610. A post-coverage 
publication is 'substantially similar' to a pre-coverage publication if both publications carry out 
the same alleged wrong." Id. at 613. Additionally, where the underlying complaint charges the 
infringing publications as separate torts, the torts that occurred during the policy period are 
covered because they are substantially different from the torts that occurred prior to the policy 
period: Id. 
Scout contends that, even if its October Post triggered the application of the exclusion, its 
later publications of the mark, occurring after coverage took effect were .. fresh wrongs" as 
described in Street Surfing because they violated OBC's other trademarks: "Beer and Ale"; 
"Beverage glassware"; "Beer"; and "Clothing." According to Scout, for Truck to be relieved of 
its duty to defend, it must establish that Scout's October Post violated all five trademarks and 
constituted a violation of each tort set forth in the OBC Complaint. 
Street Surfing lends no favor to Scout's position. There, the infringer initially sold 
skateboards affixed with a particular Street Surfing logo. Id. at 606. After obtaining insurance, 
Street Surfing expanded its product line to skateboard accessories, also affixed with the Street 
Surfing logo. Ultimately Street Surfing was sued by the owner of the mark and Street Surfing's 
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insurer refused to defend pursuant to the Prior Publication exclusion. Id. Street Surfing sued its 
insu~er, arguing inter alia, that its pre-policy publications of the logo were no~ substantially 
similar to the post-coverage advertisements because they were affixed to different products. Id. 
at 612-13. The court disagreed for two r~a.sons. First, the underlying complaint did not charge the 
misappropriations as separate torts depending on the specific advertisements. Rather, it generally 
alleged that Street Surfing infringed on the mark by using the name and logo on its products, 
without making any distinction between the types of products. Id. at 614. Second, although the 
advertisements featured di tTerent products, the court found it was not ·a "material distinction ti, 
because the advertising idea being used was the same regardless of the product: the products all 
used the allegedly infringing identification "Street Surfing." Id. 11 
In so holding, the court contrasted the facts of the case from those presented in Taco Bell 
Corp .. where the Seventh Circuit found the "fresh wrong" argument applicable. 388 F.3d at 
1073-74. In Taco Bell, the underlying complaint arose from Taco Bell's advertising campaign 
using the general theme of a "Chihuahua obsessed with the thought of Taco Bell food to the 
exclusion of anything else." Id. at I 072. The plaintiff in that suit alleged that Taco Bell had 
misappropriated a marketing gimmick he had created featuring a "psycho Chihuahua. ti Id. 
Because a portion of Taco Bell's ad campaign began before its insurance policy took effect, its 
insurer contended that the policy's Prior Publication exclusion eliminated its duty to defend. 
However, the court ruled that even though Taco Bell had used the same basic crazy Chihuahua 
theme in different ways before and after the inception of the insurance policy, the Prior 
Publication exclusion did not apply because the underlying lawsuit charged Taco Bell with 
misappropriation of distinct advertising ideas as separate torts, some of which occurred during 
the policy period. Id. 1 J 
The facts of this case are far more closely aligned with Street Surfi11g than Taco Bell. As 
in Street Surfing, the claims asserted in the OBC Complaint are grounded in Scout's continuing 
12 Sec also, Hunovl!r Ins. Co., .. Urban Ouifitters, Inc: .. 806 F.3d 761, 768 (3d Ci.r. 201S) (rejecting argument that 
Urban Outfitters pre-coverage Ul!C of the mark "Navajo" in advertising a bracelet on its website wa.,i substantially 
different from its post-coverage use of the mark in later product lines, which included clothing, shoes, flasks, etc. 
because they all carried a consistent theme and common objective). 
1
-' For e:itample. later Taco Bell commercials appropriated not only the underlying psycho Chihuahua theme, but also 




unauthorized use of the mark .. ROGUE" in advertising. Unlike in Taco Bell, OBC did not charge 
separate torts based on uses prior to versus during Truck's coverage period. Further, there is no 
thematic difference between the alleged publications as there was in Taco Bell. Rather, as in 
Street Surfing, Scours publications all arise from same single, continuing use the word 
.. ROGUE" in advertising Gone Rogue Pub, which is an appropriation of OBC's advertising idea. 
Therefore, Scout's post-effective date uses of the mark are not "fresh wrongs" which would 
avoid the application of the Prior Publication exclusion. 
In sum, Truck has established that the Prior Publication clearly and unambiguously 
excludes coverage for the claims asserted against Scout in the OBC Complaint. Consequently, 
this Court concludes as a matter of law that Truck did not have a duty to defend against the 
claims and summary judgment in Truck's favor is warranted on Scout's breach of contract claim. 
Further, where there is no coverage under an insurance policy, there can be no breach of the duty 
of good faith and fair dealing. nor can there be liability for bad faith. Rizzo v. State Farm Ins. 
Co .. 155 Idaho 75, 84,305 P.3d 519,528 (2013). Therefore, summary judgment in Truck's favor 
is also warranted on Scout's breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and 
insurance bad faith claims. 
V. ORDER 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby DENIES Scout's motion for summary judgment 
and GRANTS Truck's motion for summary judgment. A final judgment shall be issued 
contemporaneously with this Order. 
IT IS SO ORDERED 
rY_ 
Dated this /J clay of July, 2017 
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